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PUTTING THE GENIE BACK IN THE BOTTLE: THE
LEGISLATIVE STRUGGLE TO CONTAIN RULEMAKING
BY EXECUTIVE AGENCIES
DAN R. STENGLE* & JAMES PARKER RHEA**
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE formulation of public policy is primarily the responsibility of
the Legislature, which fulfills this constitutional duty through the
adoption of laws. I Shaping public policy through lawmaking is a
power exclusively within the domain of the Legislature,2 and it may
not be exercised by another governmental branch or executive
agency.3 While executive agencies may not wield lawmaking powers,
they nevertheless play a very important part in the development of
public policy through the adoption of administrative rules. Executive
agencies, however, do not have inherent rulemaking authority. 4 It is
the prerogative of the Florida Legislature, through enabling statutes,
to give agencies authority to adopt rules that implement, enforce, and
interpret a statute.' An enabling statute, however, may not provide
unbridled authority to an administrative agency to decide what the
law is. 6 A statute providing such a legislative authorization must be
* General Counsel, Florida Department of Community Affairs, 1993-present; Staff Di-
rector, Florida Senate Committee on Governmental Operations, 1987-1993; B.A., 1978, Univer-
sity of South Dakota; J.D., 1982, Florida State University College of Law.
** Legislative Analyst and Staff Attorney, Florida Senate Committee on Governmental
Operations, 1992-present; B.A. 1982, University of Maryland; M.S., 1985; J.D., 1985, Florida
State University College of Law.
The views expressed in this Article are those of the authors and are not intended to reflect the
views of the Florida Senate or the Department of Community Affairs.
This Article is dedicated to the memory of Professor Patricia A. Dore, whose scholarly contri-
butions to the field of administrative law in Florida are immeasurable.
1. Carter v. City of Stuart, 468 So. 2d 955, 957 (Fla. 1985).
2. Jones v. Department of Rev., 523 So. 2d 1211, 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); State ex rel.
Dep't of HRS v. Upchurch. 394 So. 2d 577, 580 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); see also A.T. v. State, 516
So. 2d 1104, 1105 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); T.D. v. State, 486 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
3. Smith v. State, 537 So. 2d 982, 985 (Fla. 1989); Foley v. State ex rel. Gordon, 50 So. 2d
179 (Fla. 1951).
4. FLA. STAT. § 120.54(15) (Supp. 1992); Grove Isle, Ltd. v. State Dep't of Envtl. Reg.,
454 So. 2d 571, 573 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).
5. State v. Atlantic C.L.R. Co., 47 So. 969 (1909).
6. State ex rel. Davis v. Fowler, 114 So. 435, 437 (Fla. 1927).
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complete in itself, 7 must declare the legislative policy or standard,8 and
must operate to limit the delegated power.9
While delegations of legislative authority must meet these criteria,
the level of detail a statute can contain is limited. Enacting laws that
are as specific as administrative rules may cause an over-burdened leg-
islature to become bogged down in quibbling over details not particu-
larly suited to resolution by those constitutionally charged with
crafting broad policies. Although the Legislature could draft legisla-
tion that is more specific, the Legislature has only a limited ability to
anticipate the practical aspects of a regulatory program. The range
and complexity of governmental regulatory activities often require
more specialized training and expertise than one justifiably could ex-
pect of lawmakers and legislative staff. For example, agencies regulat-
ing pollution control programs must employ hydrologists, engineers,
biologists, and the like to promulgate rules for these programs. In ad-
dition, the Legislature may be perceived as "micromanaging" execu-
tive agencies if it attempts to anticipate and address the panoply of
circumstances confronted in the execution of a regulatory scheme.
Thus, an inherent tension exists between the more general legislative
policy or standard embodied in an enabling statute and the practical
application of the statute through executive agency rulemaking.
The tension between statutory policies or standards and the rules
interpreting them may result in the perception that agencies are exer-
cising powers greater than, or at least different from, those which the
Legislature intended when it delegated the authority. Legislators, who
are more directly accountable to the electorate than bureaucrats, are
pressured by constituents to restrain the actions of executive agencies.
In particular, complaints revolve around the ever-expanding require-
ments of administrative rules. As a result, state legislatures continue
to seek methods to rein in power previously delegated to administra-
tive agencies.
7. Spencer v. Hunt, 147 So. 282, 286 (Fla. 1933); accord Florida Beverage Corp. v.
Wynne, 306 So. 2d 200, 202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975); Lewis v. Florida State Bd. of Health, 143 So.
2d 867, 875 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962), cert. denied., 149 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 1963).
8. Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So. 2d 260, 268 (Fla. 1991). In this case, the
court stated: "The Legislature can delegate functions so long as there are sufficient guidelines to
assure that the legislative intent is clearly established and can be directly followed .... What
the Legislature cannot do is delegate its policy-making responsibility." Id.; see also State ex rel.
Palm Beach Jockey Club, Inc. v. Florida State Racing Comm'n, 28 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1946).
9. Palm Beach Jockey Club, Inc., 28 So. 2d at 335; accord, Amare v. Daytona Beach
Shores, 181 So. 2d 722, 724 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966); City Council of N. Miami Beach v. Trebor
Constr. Corp., 254 So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971), cert. denied, 260 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1972);
Permenter v. Younan, 31 So. 2d 387, 389 (Fla. 1947).
EXECUTIVE AGENCY RULEMAKING
The Florida Legislature, like the United States Congress and other
state legislatures, has struggled for years to control administrative ru-
lemaking. It has utilized a variety of methods of legislative oversight
of executive agencies in general, and executive agency rulemaking in
particular. Each method has its imperfections or limitations, and thus
far the search for a system of legislative oversight and control has not
resulted in a completely satisfactory scheme. This Article examines a
number of methods available for overseeing executive agency rule-
making, evaluates many of the issues raised by legislative control, and
focuses primarily on the legislative veto of administrative rules. The
Florida Legislature and legislatures in a number of other jurisdictions
have contemplated the idea of a legislative veto of administrative
rules. This Article considers those efforts and discusses their strengths
and weaknesses.
II. OVERSEEING AND RESTRAINING ExECuTrVE AGENCIES
In Florida, when the Legislature delegates authority to an agency of
the executive branch, it maintains several mechanisms to oversee the
agency's exercise of that power. These mechanisms include: (1) exer-
cising plenary oversight of agency activities by giving legislative com-
mittees jurisdiction over them; (2) scheduling programs for mandated
reviews and repeals; (3) maintaining the Auditor General to audit and
evaluate state agencies and programs; and (4) requiring that proposed
rules be submitted to a rule oversight committee. In addition to over-
sight, the Legislature may check the exercise of delegated authority by
a variety of methods including: (1) amending the enabling law; (2)
subjecting an adopted rule to legislative ratification or amendment by
statute; and (3) refusing to appropriate funds necessary to implement
the rule, or limiting the expenditure of appropriated funds. Often, the
lines between legislative oversight and legislative control are blurred,
and some of the enumerated methods contain elements of both over-
sight and control.
The Legislature's authority to oversee executive agencies originates
from its constitutional investigatory powers. Article III, section 5 of
the Florida Constitution grants the Legislature the power to investi-
gate matters that it deems to be of concern. 10 Oversight and investiga-
tion of administrative agencies and programs occur through the
legislative committee system. The Florida Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives are authorized by section 11.141(1) and (2), Florida Sta-
tutes, to designate standing committees in such number as they deem
10. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 5.
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necessary." The standing committees are empowered to exercise a va-
riety of functions including, but not limited to, those powers enumer-
ated in article III, section 5 of the Florida Constitution, and chapter
11, Florida Statutes.'2 In addition to standing committees, the Presi-
dent of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
are authorized to appoint select committees and select joint commit-
tees." Select committees usually are appointed to investigate a particu-
lar topic or problem.
Standing and select committees have broad powers. 4 Each is au-
thorized to maintain a continuous review of the work of the state
agencies and related governmental functions within its jurisdictional
subject area. 5 To carry out its duties, each committee is empowered
with the right and authority to inspect and investigate the books, re-
cords, papers, documents, data, operation, and physical plant of any
public agency in the state. 6 Committees also have the right to sub-
poena witnesses, compel witness attendance, and compel the produc-
tion of documentary evidence . 7
Although standing and select committees have broad powers for-
malized by statute, legislative committee oversight is not conducted by
any standard procedure; instead, a variety of methods are employed.
General legislative oversight may be conducted by an informal tele-
phone inquiry, or oversight may be more formal, as in the cases of
written interim project reviews and formal public hearings with sub-
poenaed witnesses and sworn testimony. This flexibility is necessary to
tailor the legislative response to the complexity and magnitude of the
issue under consideration.
General legislative oversight by committee can be an effective tool
for directing the Legislature's attention to a specific program. It is
not, however, a systematic process for evaluating the actions of the
executive branch. '8 While standing and select committees have flexibil-
11. The Legislature has established standing committees by rule in Florida Senate Rule 2.1
and in Florida House of Representatives Rule 6.1.
12. FLA. STAT. § 11.141(3) (1991).
13. Id. § 11.141(4).
14. See id. § 11.143 (Supp. 1992).
15. Id. § 11.143(1).
16. Id. § 11.143(2).
17. Id. § 11.143(3).
18. Although the oversight process can be an effective coercive power, as Justice White, in
his dissent in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, stated: "Oversight hearings and
congressional investigations have their purpose, but unless Congress is to be rendered a think
tank or debating society, they are no substitute for the exercise of actual authority .... " 462
U.S. 919 n. 10 (1983) (White, J., dissenting). The Chadha case is discussed more specifically infra
part IV.
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ity to investigate matters within their purview, the framework for gen-
eral legislative oversight is naturally piecemeal. The process depends
largely upon the interests of current committee chairpersons and the
legislative leadership. Very often, constituents or the media identify
problems in programs which pique legislative interests. As a result, the
Legislature's attention may be focused reactively, as problems arise,
rather than proactively, before problems develop.
On the other hand, simply because an oversight process is system-
atic does not necessarily mean it is effective. For example, the Legisla-
ture established a systematic method for legislative oversight by
scheduling some types of enabling statutes for legislative review before
a mandatory future repeal date. In the review process, the Legislature
evaluated certain programs that had been delegated to executive
branch agencies. Legislative oversight of certain executive functions
by this method was embodied in the "sunset" law, while particular
executive branch entities were targeted for examination under the
"sundown" law. Sunset, as embodied in the Regulatory Sunset Act of
1976,19 served as the mechanism for review of statutes regulating
professions, occupations, businesses, and industries. The Sundown
Act, 2° enacted in 1978 as a supplement to sunset, provided a legislative
review of the need for and benefits derived from statutorily created
advisory bodies, commissions, and boards of trustees adjunct to exec-
utive agencies. Both the sunset and sundown laws set schedules for
repeal based on ten year cycles. In addition, both specified criteria for
evaluation of the statutory basis or entity being reviewed. The review
criteria were established to evaluate public benefits, potential harms,
and costs of the system of regulation, as well as the costs of operating
the adjunct entity.2'
In the 1987-88 legislative interim, legislative staff studied the effect-
iveness of the sunset and sundown laws. 22 The initial review of these
laws found the oversight benefits intangible, and suggested that the
benefits were insignificant when compared to the costs of the system-
atic reviews conducted under sunset and sundown. 23
19. Ch. 76-168, 1976 Fla. Laws 295 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 11.61 (Supp. 1976)).
20. Ch. 78-323, 1978 Fla. Laws 899 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 11.611 (Supp. 1978)).
21. SeeFLA. STAT. §§ 11.61, 11.611 (1991).
22. STAFF OF FLA. S. Comm. ON GoviT. OPs., A REvmw OF THE SUNSET AND SUNDOWN
LAws OF FLORIDA (1988) (on file with comm.) [hereinafter FIRST SENATE REVIEW OF SUNSET].
The review was assigned by Senate President John Vogt, Dem., Cocoa Beach, 1974-1988. Id.
23. The review found that the Senate alone incurred an estimated $141,827 to conduct 13
sunset reviews assigned in the 1987-88 interim, and $106,904 to conduct the 28 sundown reviews
assigned in the same period. FRST SENATE REVIEW OF SUNSET, supra note 22, at 5-7, 73-79, 89-
90. The review recommended that the sunset and sundown laws be scheduled for future repeal,
19931
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A second review of the sunset and sundown laws was conducted in
the 1991-92 legislative interim. 24 This second review reached conclu-
sions similar to those of the first review25 and additionally found the
following:
[G]eneral oversight by legislative staff of executive agencies and of
the statutes which govern them has decreased as staff has been
required to perform an increasing number of reviews assigned by
law. Since general oversight responisibilities are of a more
discretionary nature, reviews which are required by statute
necessarily take precedence over projects which are discretionary. 2
In response, the Senate Committee on Governmental Operations,
manifesting its dissatisfaction with these systematic oversight proc-
esses, introduced a bill to repeal the sunset and sundown laws. 27 The
and that criteria (similar to the criteria to which sunset and sundown subjected other laws prior
to their reenactment) be established for the review of sunset and sundown laws. Id. at 7, 89-90.
Ultimately, those recommendations did not become law. Florida Senate Bill 1057 (1988), which
contained those recommendations, passed the Senate 31-0 but died in the House of Representa-
tives. FLA. S. JouR. 568 (Reg. Sess. 1988).
24. STAFF OF FLA. S. Com. ON GownL Oss., A RE viw OF THE REGULATORY SUNSET ACT
AND THE SUNDOwN ACT (Sept. 1991) (on file with comm.) (hereinafter SECOND SENATE REvIEw
or SUNSET]. The review was assigned by Senate President Gwen Margolis, Dem., North Miami
Beach, 1980-1992. Id.
25. SECOND SENATE REviEw oF SuNsEr, supra note 24, at 4, 48-53, 70.
26. Id. at 5. With that recognition, the review recommended that the repeal and review
cycle, subsequent to the first scheduled repeal and review 10 years after enactment, be extended
to 20 years. Id. at 5, 7, 68-69, 71-74. This would have effectively lessened the time spent on
sunset and sundown reviews, and thus increased the amount of time spent by staff and legisla-
tors on more traditional legislative oversight.
27. Fla. SB 296 (1991). Although it did not recommend repeal, the review acknowledged,
"[A] credible case can be made for repeal of the Sunset and Sundown laws." SECOND SENATE
REVIEW OF SUNSET, supra note 24, at 65. A portion of the deliberations in committee following
the staff's presentation of the second review, which led to the introduction of the bill to repeal
the sunset and sundown acts, is illuminating with respect to the dissatisfaction with the subject
acts:
Sen. Jeanne Malchon, Dem., St. Petersburg, 1982-1992, Chair, stated:
I seem to be stuck with two committees that are doing most of [the sunset and
sundown reviews], the [Governmental Operations Committee] and the Health Care
Committee [in] which we have been just inundated with [reviews]. From my own expe-
rience, things that I have discussed with staff of both committees that I thought we
should be doing some preliminary investigation ... possibly leading to legislation or
maybe not . . . they [staff] have been unable to do because of the [reviews].
Sen. Bob Johnson, Repub., Sarasota, 1984-1992, stated:
The fact is that this is a "feel good" law. This law doesn't do anything for any
person out there that I know of in the State of Florida out of the 13 million citizens,
except make some people and maybe some editorial writers feel good.
The beauty of the United States Constitution and our [Florida] Constitution is that
we're supposed to be a citizen legislature. We bring to this body our own backgrounds
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Legislature, prior to the next ensuing regular session, repealed the
Regulatory Sunset Act and the Sundown Act, albeit with a delayed
effective date, 28 the day following adjournment sine die of the 1993
Regular Session.29
Thus, a systematic method of legislative oversight was repealed in
favor of general legislative oversight. Although the reviews conducted
under sunset and sundown were systematic, they were found to be an
inadequate tool for comprehensive legislative oversight, at least when
posited against the cost. As noted, the scheduled sunset and sundown
reviews were conducted at the expense of general legislative oversight
which, while not systematic, is responsive to identified problems and
is more comprehensive than the reviews of occupational regulatory
schemes, and such entities as boards, commissions, and advisory
which tend to bear upon laws that are passed. There has never been a 10-year cycle or
7-year cycle in which every law in this State has not been reviewed by us in some way
and some fashion. I'll give you an example. Under the Educational Accountability
Act, every education law in this State was reviewed. It was not really a sunset date; it
was just the fact that we had to review every single law to see how it fit into a new
philosophy and program that was going to move forward in education. We did some
of the same stuff in [the areas of] health care and [health and rehabilitative services].
I would suggest that this [sunset] law is worthless. In truth, the law is worthless, and
we ought to be willing to stand up and say it is a "feel good" law.... This is a waste
of everybody's time, including about 3 days of the Session floor [deliberations]. I
don't know why we sit here and suffer through it. We ought to just face it up and say,
"Let's repeal the sunset law," and understand that we're doing this review on a regu-
lar, recurring, annual, [and] daily basis with our own experiences and our own back-
grounds and motivations. I would suggest that we take the highest road we can and
save the money and let the staff do important things.
Sen. Curt Kiser, Repub., Palm Harbor, stated:
Madam Chairman, I think, too, to play on something that Senator Johnson
said.... In years past, when I was [Governmental Operations Committee] Chairman,
at the end of the [legislative] session, I would sit down with [staff] and go over our
request to the [Senate] President for interim projects. Every time we would come up
with the different issues that had surfaced during the year in the committee, and re-
quests by committee members, [staff] would always remind me, "Well, now, Senator
Kiser, we've got this many sundowns [and] sunset projects coming up." So we would
have to scale back our requests for these interim projects because half or two-thirds of
[the staff] workload was already set by these reviews. [If] you now take that burden
off and say, "No, you're not going to have that," if the committee decides they really
want to look at [a] whole chapter, in effect doing a "sunset" of a certain area, that's
fine, but that's our choosing to do it. It would just open up that many more areas to
the wishes of the committee members, and other current issues that surface you'd be
able to look at. And so I agree with Senator Johnson, the workload is still going to be
pretty much substantial.
Fla. S. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., tape recording of proceedings (Sept. 12, 1991) (on file with
comm.) (discussion of PCB 1 (1991)).
28. Fla. SB 28-D (Special Session "D", Dec. 1991) (enacted as ch. 91-429, §§ 4-5, 1991 Fla.
Laws 83, 92).
29. Ch. 91-429, § 5, 1991 Fla. Laws 83, 102.
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councils. Of course, the Legislature retains the option of scheduling
for future repeal and prior review any statutory program or entity it
desires, an option which is sometimes exercised. 0
While the non-systematic statutory repeal and prior review process
has yet to be deemed a fully effective tool for legislative oversight of
executive agencies, this device proves useful in checking delegated au-
thority. The initial enactment of an enabling law with a future repeal
mechanism ensures that the Legislature will have an opportunity to
amend or to allow the repeal of the enabling law when the delegation
of authority is set to expire. If the Legislature desires to amend the
enabling law to reenact the delegation of authority, it may do so;
however, the Legislature's ability to amend the initial delegation is
limited. If the Governor finds the amendments offensive, he may veto
the reenactment legislation. Nevertheless, there are consequences to
the executive veto in these circumstances. A veto of a reenactment op-
erates to repeal all of the law, including the original delegation of au-
thority. Therefore, to retain any delegation of authority in a
particular area, the executive branch may be required to capitulateto
the legislative amendments to the delegation.
The audit process also acts as a means of legislative oversight of
executive agencies and programs. Article III, section 2 of the Florida
Constitution directs the Legislature to appoint an auditor to audit
public records and perform related duties as prescribed by law or con-
current legislative resolution.' Section 11.41, Florida Statutes, desig-
nates the constitutional auditor as the Auditor General.3 2 The Auditor
General is required by law to conduct annual financial audits of the
accounts and records of all state agencies, of all district school
boards, and of all district boards of the state's community colleges. 3
In addition, the Auditor General may, at any time, conduct a per-
formance or financial audit of any governmental entity in the state,
including all units of local government.3 4
Furthermore, the law requires the Auditor General to conduct per-
formance audits of each new major program and each major modifi-
cation to an existing program within three years following creation or
modification." Additionally, the Auditor General must conduct per-
30. See STAFF OF FLA. JT. LEoIS. MGor. Comm., DIv. OF STATUTORY REVISION, 1992 SUN-
SET/SUNDOWN HANDBOOK AND OTHER LEOSI.ATIVE REPEALS 193-210 (Dec. 1992) (on file with
Comm.).
31. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 2.
32. FA. STAT. § 11.41 (Supp. 1992). The duties of the Auditor General are set forth, gener-
ally, in sections 11.42-.50, Florida Statutes.
33. FLA. STAT. § 11.45(3)(a)(1)(1991).
34. Id. § 11.45(3)(a)(2).
35. Id. § 11.45(3)(a).
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formance audits for each major state program on a ten year sched-
ule.36 The objective of these audits, which are in-depth studies of
individual state programs and functions, is to provide accurate, relia-
ble information that the Legislature or the administering agency may
use in evaluating programs . 7
Performance audits, which are conducted by the Auditor General,
serve several purposes: they review whether programs are meeting
statutory requirements, 8 state which statutory requirements have been
met, and make recommendations to the Legislature and the agency
which, if followed, result in statutory compliance. 9 The performance
audit also contains the agency response to the audit findings.
Performance audits by the Auditor General are comprehensive and
thorough and represent a device by which the audited agency may
take steps to rectify deficiencies noted in audit findings and recom-
mendations. The audits also serve a prophylactic function because
agency activities generally may be more thoughtful, well reasoned, or
lawful due to the anticipation of future audits by the Auditor General.
The Auditor General's audits, however, generally do not translate di-
rectly into legislative action. At best, if an individual legislator or
committee determines that a legislative response is necessary, the audit
report may form a basis for introducing individual bills.4
36. Id. § 11.45(3)(b).
37. See, e.g., STAFF OF FLA. OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL, PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE
Div. OF ADMIN. HEA iNoS (May 31, 1990) (on file with office); FLA. OFFICE OF THE AuDrroa
GENERAL, PERFORMANCE AUDIT oF THE SENIOR MomT. SERv. SYs. AND THE SELECTED EXEMPT
SERV. Sys. (Dec. 21, 1992) (on file with office) [hereinafter SMS & SES AuDrr].
38. The objectives of the performance audit of the senior management service (SMS) system
and the selected exempt service (SES) system dated December 21, 1992, included determining
whether the Department of Management Services had adopted necessary rules for recruitment
and selection of SMS and SES employees; whether the department complied with statutory re-
quirements to audit agency records in order to ensure compliance with all statutes and rules
governing recruitment of SMS and SES employees; whether the department established a classi-
fication and pay plan, salaries, benefits for SMS and SES employees as required by law; and
whether the department monitored agency compliance with statutes and rules regulating classifi-
cation, pay, salaries, and benefits of SMS and SES employees. SMS & SES AuDrr, supra note
37.
39. For example, in the performance audit of the senior management service (SMS) system
and the selected exempt service (SES) system dated December 21, 1992, the Auditor General
noted that the statutes specified the responsibilities of the Department of Management Services
regarding training of SMS employees, but not SES employees, and recommended that the Legis-
lature consider amending the statutes to specify the Department's responsibilities regarding the
training of SES employees. Id. at 29. The report also recommended that the Legislature clarify
its intent regarding retirement benefit levels for SES employees. Id. at 45. In addition, the report
recommended to the agency that it adopt rules that require state agencies to develop procedures
for selecting SMS and SES candidates, and that these rules, at a minimum, require agencies to
develop selection procedures to guide staff in reviewing qualification of individuals in the appli-
cant pool for a specific SMS and SES position. Id. at 24.
40. By law, at public hearings, each legislative standing committee is directed to consider
1993]
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Another mechanism by which the Legislature oversees administra-
tive agencies is directed specifically to rulemaking. This mechanism
requires the submission of proposed rules to a rule oversight commit-
tee. In 1974, the Legislature created the Administrative Procedures
Committee (commonly referred to as the "Joint Administrative Pro-
cedures Committee," hereinafter the "JAPC") 4' as a standing joint
legislative committee with the duty to keep watch over administrative
rules.4 2 Although its primary duties, as explicitly set forth in the stat-
ute, were to establish a "legislative check on legislatively created au-
thority, ' 43 the JAPC does not operate to control directly proposed
agency rules, and agencies are not required to capitulate to the JAPC
objections. Thus, the requirement that proposed rules must be submit-
ted to the JAPC operates more as an oversight mechanism than as an
actual check or control of agency functions.
Section 120.545, Florida Statutes, requires the JAPC to examine all
proposed executive agency administrative rules and authorizes it to ex-
amine any existing administrative rule." The JAPC is authorized to
conduct formative and substantive reviews.4 5 The substantive areas of
performance audit recommendations within the subject area of the committee's jurisdiction. Ch.
91-429, § 1, 1991 Fla. Laws 83, 84. To date, this requirement has not been implemented syste-
matically. See, e.g., Memorandum from Terry Shoffstall, Staff Dir., Jt. Legis. Audit. Comm.,
to Steve Kahn, Gen. Counsel, Office of the Senate President (Dec. 1, 1992) (on file with comm.).
41. Ch. 74-310, § 2, 1974 Fla. Laws 972.
42. The JAPC is comprised of three state representatives appointed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and three senators appointed by the President of the Senate. The enu-
merated duties of the JAPC, which are contained in section 11.60, Florida Statutes, include: (a)
maintaining a continuous review of the statutory authority upon which each administrative rule
is based and, whenever such authority is eliminated or significantly changed by repeal, amend-
ment, holding by a court of last resort, or other factor, advising the agency concerned of that
fact; (b) maintaining a continuous review of administrative rules and identifying and requesting
that an agency repeal any rule or any provision of a rule that reiterates or paraphrases any
statute or for which the statutory authority has been repealed; (c) reviewing administrative rules
and advising the agency concerned of its findings; (d) assuming the duties prescribed by chapter
120 concerning the adoption and promulgation of rules; (e) reviewing agency action pursuant to
the operation of the Administrative Procedure Act; (f) reporting to the Legislature at least an-
nually and recommending needed legislation or other appropriate action; (g) seeking review in
the courts of the state, on behalf of the Legislature or the citizens of the state, of the validity or
invalidity of any administrative rule to which the Committee has voted an objection and which
has not been withdrawn, modified, repealed, or amended to meet the objection. FLA. STAT. §
11.60 (1991).
43. Id. § 120.545(1).
44. Id. § 120.545.
45. Section 120.545(l), Florida Statutes, authorizes the JAPC, when examining each rule,
to review whether: (a) the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority; (b) the
statutory authority for the rule has been repealed; (c) the rule reiterates or paraphrases statutory
material; (d) the rule is in proper form; (e) the notice given prior to its adoption was sufficient to
give adequate notice of the purpose and effect of the rule; and (f) the economic impact statement
accompanying the rule is adequate to accurately inform the public of the economic effect of the
rule. FLA. STAT. § 120.545(1) (1991).
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review conducted by the JAPC include determining whether the rule is
an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority and whether the
statutory authority for the rule has been repealed. Obviously, if the
enabling law for a rule has been repealed, the foundation for the rule
has been removed and the rule is no longer authorized. Whether the
statutory authority for a rule has been repealed requires a more
straightforward analysis than does a review of an invalid exercise of
delegated legislative authority.
An "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority" is statutorily
defined as an action which goes beyond legislatively delegated powers,
functions, and duties. 4" Such an invalid exercise exists if one or more
of the following apply:
(a) The agency has materially failed to follow the applicable rule-
making procedures set forth in section 120.54, Florida Sta-
tutes;
(b) The agency has exceeded its grant of rulemaking authority, ci-
tation to which is required by section 120.54(7);
(c) The rule enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provi-
sions of law implemented, citation to which is required by sec-
tion 120.54(7);
(d) The rule is vague, fails to establish adequate standards for
agency decisions, or vests unbridled discretion in the agency;
or
(e) The rule is arbitrary or capricious.47
The power of the JAPC to review executive agency administrative
rules may be described best as a power to influence or pressure, not as
a power to require or command. Thus, the JAPC may not require
that its objections to an administrative rule be resolved as it desires.
Upon notification of JAPC objections, the agency may modify,
amend, withdraw, or repeal the rule, but it is not required to do any
of the foregoing. If the JAPC objects to a proposed or existing rule
and the agency refuses to modify, amend, withdraw, or repeal it, the
JAPC must file with the Department of State a notice detailing its
objection." The Department of State publishes this notice in the Flor-
ida Administrative Weekly. 9 The agency, however, may continue to
enforce the disputed rule unless the JAPC chooses to take further ac-
tion. 0 The JAPC has standing to seek judicial review, on behalf of
46. Id. § 120.52(8).
47. Id.
48. Id. § 120.545(8) (1991).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 11.60(2)(k).
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the public or the Legislature, of any rule to which it has objected and
which has not been modified or repealed in response to the JAPC's
objection." Should the JAPC decide to seek judicial review, it is re-
quired to notify the head of the agency involved, notify the Governor,
and provide an opportunity for agency consultation with the commit-
tee to attempt to resolve the dispute.52 If the issue cannot be resolved
through consultation, the JAPC may bring an action in the appropri-
ate court requesting that the rule be declared invalid. 53 To date, the
JAPC has not sought judicial review of any agency administrative
rule. It may be that the JAPC has not been compelled to seek judicial
review because agencies have tended to comply with the JAPC's re-
commendations.-
While the legislative exercise of oversight may encourage change,
the Legislature also has the fundamental power to mandate change.




54. The table below is a comprehensive listing of the number of proposed rules processed
by the JAPC from 1982 through 1992. Column 2 lists the number of agency rules submitted in
each calendar year. Columns 3 and 4 show the number of technical and substantive errors as
characterized by the JAPC staff in proposed rules and which were changed by the agencies in
response to the JAPC staff. Column 5 documents the number of times agencies did not change
proposed rules in response to the JAPC staff review and formal objections were actually voted
by the committee. Column 6 indicates the number of times an agency initially refused to modify
their particular rule after a committee objection. Yet, as indicated by columns 7 and 8, these
rules were all ultimately amended to meet the JAPC objections or had their enabling statute
amended to conform to the rule (column 8). According to the staff of the JAPC, during this ten
year period, after each objection, the agencies either amended their proposed rules or the Legis-
lature enacted legislation clearly authorizing the rules which were originally objected to by the
JAPC as invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Year Number Techs Subs. Obj. Initial Rules Law
Noticed Found Found Voted Refusal Amended Passed
1982 3980 2882 238 0 0 0 0
1983 3417 2975 297 37 0 30 7
1984 4488 10673 838 2 0 2 0
1985 4456 5479 943 89 62 73 16
1986 4121 4088 1173 12 1 12 0
1987 3610 3337 1426 31 4 31 0
1988 3706 3894 1432 14 9 11 3
1989 4865 2878 1069 24 1 13 11
1990 4753 1544 885 4 0 4 0
1991 4310 1361 934 17 0 15 2
1992 7160 1922 1236 0 0 0 0
Document (undated) provided by Jt. Admin. Procs. Comm. (on file with Fla. S. Govtl. Ops.
Comm.).
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oversight process." The most readily apparent method for the Legisla-
ture to nullify an administrative rule is by the adoption of a statute
that either sets forth a new legislative policy or standard or amends an
existing statute to clarify the original policy or standard.5 6
One rather unusual method by which the Legislature may compel
change is by requiring an executive agency to submit its rule to the
55. For example, in the 1988-89 legislative interim, the staff of the Senate Governmental
Operations Committee reviewed and evaluated the effectiveness of laws, practices, and proce-
dures pertaining to the indexing of agency orders issued under the Administrative Procedure
Act, chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Senate President Bob Crawford, Dem., Winter Haven, 1982-
1990, assigned the review at the request of Committee Chair Senator Curt Kiser, Repub., Palm
Harbor. STAFF OF FLA. S. COMM. ON Gov-rL. Ops., A REvIEw OF INDEXING OF AGENCY ORDERS
ISSUED PURSUANT TO CHAPTER 120, F.S., THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (April 1989) (on
file with comm.). The report found shortcomings in the law and found agencies failed to effec-
tively institute practices and procedures for adequately indexing administrative orders and mak-
ing them available to the public. Id. at 3-10, 120-136. The report recommended corrective
statutory amendments and recommended that the Department of State be vested with the re-
sponsibility for devising a plan for the publication of agency orders. Id. In response to the in-
terim project report, the Governmental Operations Committee sponsored Committee Substitute
for Senate Bill 1334 (1989), which related to subject matter indexing and availability of agency
orders. The bill only passed the Senate. FLA. S. Jous. 503 (Reg. Sess. 1989). In 1990, the com-
mittee again studied the issue. STFr oF FLA. S. Comm. ON GOVTL. Os., A SUPPLEMENT TO A
REVIEW OF INDEXING OF AGENCY ORDERS ISStED PURSUANT TO CHAPTER 120, F.S., Tim ADMaN-
IsTRATrvE PROCEDURE ACT (Mar. 1990) (on file with comm.) [hereinafter INDEXING SUPPLEMEN-
TAL REVIEW]. The Governmental Operations Committee again sponsored legislation, Committee
Substitute for Senate Bill 2550 (1990), which would have carried out the interim project report's
recommendations that the Department of State be given general authority over agency indexing
and administrative order availability, and that agencies promulgate rules to carry out their index-
ing and availability responsibilities. Id. at 3-10, 39-48. The bill died in the Senate Appropriations
Committee at the conclusion of the 1990 regular session. FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL
INFORMATION, 1990 REoULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 204, CS for SB 2550. Based
on the previous interim project reports, in 1991, former Governmental Operations Committee
Chair Senator Kiser introduced Senate Bill 900, which addressed the indexing and availability of
agency orders. The Senate passed the bill, which later died in the House of Representatives at the
end of the 1991 regular session. FLA. S. JouR. 345, 349 (Reg. Sess. Apr. 9. 1991). The entirety of
Senate Bill 900, however, was included in House Bill 1879 by amendment on the Senate floor.
FLA. S. JoR. 122 (Reg. Sess. Mar. 14, 1991). The provisions passed and became law without the
Governor's signature on April 27, 1991. Ch. 91-30, 1991 Fla. Laws 191, 200. While the passage
of indexing legislation was the ultimate result of legislative oversight, it serves as an example of
how circuitous and uncertain the legislative oversight process can be. For a more comprehensive
treatment of this particular oversight example, see Patricia A. Dore, Florida Limits Policy De-
velopments Through Administrative Adjudication and Requires Indexing and Availability of
Agency Orders, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 437 (1991).
56. For example, Rule 10M-12.007(3) of the Florida Administrative Code (1986) required
for licensing purposes that at least one child care worker per child care facility receive training
and certification in accordance with chapter IOD-13 of the Code. Private child care providers
advocated a change in the statute to exempt child care personnel from this food certification
requirement. Committee Substitute for Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 1436 (1991)
amended section 381.0072(8), Florida Statutes, to specifically exempt child care facilities licensed
under chapter 402 from the food certification requirement, which thereby overrode the provi-
sions in chapter 10M-12 of the Code. Ch. 91-297, § 31, 1991 Fla. Laws 2832, 2858 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 381.0072(8) (1991)).
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Legislature for ratification or amendment. Section 403.817, Florida
Statutes, requires the Department of Environmental Regulation (now
the Department of Environmental Protection)5 7 to maintain, by rule, a
vegetative index which assists in the determination of the landward
extent of the state's regulatory jurisdiction. 8 That statute contains the
uncommon requirement that the Legislature approve any amendment
to the index prior to the amendment becoming effective.59 Section
403.817(1) specifies the legislative intent that the Department establish
a method of making determinations of the landward extent of waters
of the state (which is the basis for the State's regulatory jurisdiction)
based upon ecological factors. 60 Section 403.817(2) grants rulemaking
authority for the method.6 By law, the Legislature has specified that
amendments to the dredge and fill rules that make additions or dele-
tions to the vegetative index must be submitted in bill form to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Sen-
ate for their consideration and referral to appropriate committees. 62
Amendments to the rules are effective only upon approval by the Leg-
islature. 63 Whenever the Legislature amends any exemption relating to
dredging and filling, the Department is authorized to amend the rules
to be consistent with legislative changes. 64 Section 403.8171 contains
specific legislative ratification of the vegetative index. 65 Even more sig-
nificantly, however, the statute makes specific changes, by law, to the
rule. 66 In 1993, the Legislature again specifically directed an agency
rulemaking effort in the subject area of the State's regulatory jurisdic-
tion over wetlands. In the bill that merged the Department of Envi-
ronmental Regulation and the Department of Natural Resources into
the newly-created Department of Environmental Protection, 67 the Leg-
57. See Ch. 93-213, 1993 Fla. Laws 2129.
58. FLA. STAT. § 403.817 (1991).
59. Id.
60. Id. § 403.817(1).
61. Id. § 403.817(2).
62. Id. § 403.817(3); ch. 77-170, § 1, 1977 Fla. Laws 710, 710.
63. Id.
64. FLA. STAT. § 403.817(3) (1991); ch. 85-269, § 5, 1985 Fla. Laws 1733, 1735; see also
JoN BARTar, FAmiLAR QUOTATIONS 469, at entry 12 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992). Al-
though this arguably may serve as a cautionary directive by the Legislature, this is simply no
more than a statement of the constitutional limits of delegated legislative authority to the execu-
tive branch.
65. FLA. STAT. § 403.8171 (1991); ch. 84-79, § 9, 1984 Fla. Laws 202, 216.
66. FLA. STAT. § 403.8171 (1991); ch. 84-79, § 9, 1984 Fla. Laws 202, 216. The section
deletes and adds new vegetation to the vegetative index rule, adds methods for determining types
of strata, and provides that certain scientifically-enumerated species of flora are not to be con-
sidered submerged, transitional, or upland species, and requires that other plant indicator species
must be used.
67. Fla. CS for CS for HB 1751 (1993); ch. 93-213, 1993 Fla. Laws 2129.
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islature mandated the adoption of a unified statewide methodology
for the delineation of wetlands.6A The law provides that the methodol-
ogy will not be effective unless ratified by the Legislature.69
A similar example is contained in the statutes on comprehensive
plans. The Legislature effectively requires, in section 163.3177(9),
Florida Statutes, that administrative rules be submitted for ratifica-
tion and amendment. 70 In that law, the Legislature requires the state
land planning agency to adopt minimum criteria for the review and
determination of compliance of local government comprehensive plan
elements, and further specifies particular elements that must be in-
cluded in the rules. 7 1
Initially, these rules were effective only after submission to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives for legislative review.72 By law, in its review, the Legislature has
specifically authorized itself to reject, modify, or take no action rela-
tive to the rules. 73 The agency is directed to make such changes to the
rules as the Legislature requires and, if the Legislature directs that no
action be taken, the law specifies that the rules are effective as
adopted by the agency.74 When the required rules originally were sub-
mitted as mandated by law, the Legislature statutorily acknowledged
its review of the rules and specified the legislative intent of the rules in
the statute.75 Additionally, the law directs the executive department to
adopt amendments as necessary to conform the rules with the require-
68. Fla. CS for CS for HB 1751 (1993). The Legislature directed that the methodology
should consider vegetation and soil differences between regions, as well as the extent of surface
waters other than wetlands. Id.
69. Id. The bill also repealed the statutes directing and ratifying the vegetative index, sec-
tions 403.817 and 403.8171, the repeal to be effective only upon legislative ratification of the
new methodology. Id. § 47.
70. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177 (1991); ch. 85-55, § 6, 1985 Fla. Laws 207, 215.
71. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(9) (1991). Examples of such required provisions include criteria
for determining whether proposed elements are in compliance with part II of chapter 163,
whether elements of the local government comprehensive plan are consistent with each other, the
state comprehensive plan, and the regional policy plan, and whether elements identify the need
for and the processes and procedures to ensure coordination of all development activities and
services with other units of local government, regional planning agencies, water management




75. Id. § 163.3177(10) (1991); ch. 86-191, § 7, 1986 Florida Laws 1404, 1415. Examples of
the legislative intent specified for the required rules included definitions of terms used in the
rules, and particular conditions for the exercise of state governmental regulatory authority. The
law also specifies that, in the event that any portion of chapter 9J-5, Florida Administrative
Code, was in conflict with chapter 163, Florida Statutes (1986), the appropriate statutory provi-
sion would prevail.
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ments of the stated legislative intent . 6 Finally, the law specifically lim-
its authorized challenges to the rules under chapter 120, the
Administrative Procedure Act.17
The ability of the Legislature to establish a new policy or standard,
or to clarify an original policy or standard controlling the content of
an administrative rule is limited by the executive power to veto legisla-
tion. 7 Likewise, the executive veto also must be considered when an
enabling law requires submission of an executive agency rule for rati-
fication or amendment by the Legislature. 79 Thus, the Governor's veto
power is an important legal and political limitation on the inherent
power of the Legislature to shape public policy through the adoption
of laws.
The Florida Constitution requires that every bill which is approved
by the Legislature be presented to the Governor.80 A bill which is pre-
sented to the Governor becomes law if the Governor approves and
signs it, or if the Governor fails to veto it within seven consecutive
days after presentment.8 ' The Governor is not authorized to modify or
change the effect of a proposed law. With the exception of general
appropriations bills, the Governor may only approve or disapprove
the bill as a whole, as article III, section 8, subsection (a) of the Flor-
ida Constitution provides that a veto extends to the entire bill.82 In the
case of a general appropriations bill, the Governor may veto any spe-
cific appropriation, although he may not veto a restriction or qualifi-
76. FLA. STAT. § 163.3177(10) (1991).
77. Section 163.3177(10)(k), Florida Statutes, is known as the "shield law" in common par-
lance in the subject area of growth management in Florida. The provision states:
It is the intent of the Legislature that there should be no doubt as to the legal stand-
ing of chapter 9J-5, F.A.C., at the close of the 1986 legislative session. Therefore, the
Legislature declares that changes made to chapter 9J-5, F.A.C., prior to October 1,
1986, shall not be subject to rule challenges under s. 120.54(4) [a proceeding for chal-
lenges to proposed rules], or to drawout proceediigs under s. 120.54(17) [a formal
proceeding to protect the rights of certain persons affected by a rulemaking proceed-
ing]. The entire chapter 9J-5, F.A.C., as amended, shall be subject to rule challenges
under s. 120.56 [a proceeding for challenges to existing rules], as nothing herein shall
be construed to indicate approval or disapproval of any portion of chapter 9J-5,
F.A.C., not specifically addressed herein. No challenge pursuant to s. 120.56 may be
filed after July 1, 1987. Any subsequent amendments to chapter 9J-5, F.A.C., exclu-
sive of the amendments adopted prior to October 1, 1986 pursuant to this act, shall be
subject to the full chapter 120 [Administrative Procedure Act] process. All amend-
ments shall have effective dates as provided in chapter 120 and submission to the Pres-
ident of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives shall not be required.
Id.
78. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 8(a).
79. Id.
80. Id. art. III, § 8.
81. Id.
82. Id. art III, §8(a).
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cation without vetoing the appropriation to which it relates.8 3 Thus,
once a legislative standard has been signed into law, the ability of the
Legislature to modify or void an administrative rule which was
adopted pursuant to the original enabling statute is limited to the ex-
tent that the Governor is in agreement with the policy change. Fur-
thermore, situations where the Legislature requires a rule to be
legislatively ratified or amended is subject to an executive veto. The
Legislature, however, may override a veto of a bill or reinstate the
vetoed specific appropriation of a general appropriations bill upon a
two-thirds vote of each house."
Historically, statutory requirements that rules be subjected to
amendment or ratification by the Legislature are uncommon, and per-
haps, justifiably so. These statutes require the Legislature to deal with
a level of detail in the statutory enactment that is, at best, cumber-
some. This not only creates an incongruence in the law, which is ordi-
narily of a more general nature than agency rules, it requires the kind
of statutory drafting that is not particularly amenable either to logical
amendment or effective legislative debate.85 The use of legislative rati-
fication and amendment of executive agency rules heretofore has been
used sparingly, and only in those cases where the Legislature deter-
mined that a high level of legislative control was necessary.
The power of the purse represents a less direct method of checking
legislatively delegated authority. Budgeting for state programs has a
significant impact on the actions of executive agencies. Both the exec-
83. Id.
84. Id. art. III, § 8.
85. As an example of the specialized knowledge required for effective consideration of what
a rule should contain, section 403.8171, Florida Statutes, proves quite interesting. That statutory
ratification of the vegetative index, discussed supra, provides, in part:
Pursuant to s. 403.817, the Legislature ratifies the rule adopted on January 25, 1984,
by the Environmental Regulation Commission with the following changes:
(l)(a) In Rule 17-4.022(2), Florida Administrative Code, the following shall be re-
moved: Blechnum serrulatum; Carex leptalea; Carex stipata; Carya aquatica; Cono-
carpus erectus; Crataegus viridis; Cymodocea filiformis; Cyper odoratus; Dishromena
spp.; Dryopteris ludoviciana; Gleditsia aquatica; Gratiola ramosa; halodule beaudet-
te; Hypericum fasciculatum; Illicium floridanum, Iiriodendron tulipifera in all coun-
ties south of Taylor, Lafayette, Suwannee, Columbia, Baker, and Duval; Lycopus
rubellus; Myrica inodora; Osmunda spp.; Panicum repens; Panicum virgatum; Plu-
chea spp.; Polygala cymosa; Populus deltoides; Rhexia, all species except R. alifanus,
R. lutea, R. mariana, R. petiolata, and R. virginica; Sabatia bartramii; Sarracenia
spp.; Schizachyrium rhizomatum; Sesuvium maritimum; Sesuvium portulacastrum;
Spartina spp.; Thalasia testudinum; and Woodwardia spp.
(b) In Rule 17-4.022(2), Florida Administrative Code, the following shall be added:
Muhlenbergia capillaris; Muhlenbergia schreberi; Osmunda regalis; Rhexia pervtyiora;
Rhexia salicifolia; and Spartina, all species except S. bakerii.
FA. STAT. § 403.8171 (1993).
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utive and legislative branches have important roles in the development
of state policies and programs through the budgeting process. Al-
though both branches have significant responsibilities in this en-
deavor, it is the Legislature that decides whether to fund executive
agency programs. In the appropriations process, however, the Legisla-
ture does more than simply authorize the expenditure of monies from
public coffers. Fundamental policy decisions are shaped through allo-
cating various resources, as well as expressly limiting an expenditure's
allocation. Thus, the Legislature, directly and impliedly, sets policy
through the appropriations process.86
As to the express limitations placed on an allocation, section
216.177, Florida Statutes, governs the form and content of the annual
statement of intent that accompanies each General Appropriations
Act. The law provides that the statement of intent constitutes a mani-
festation of how the Legislature, as a representative of the people,
believes appropriations should be spent.87 To establish intent in the
development of the approved operating budget, the statement of in-
tent compares the request of the agency or the recommendation of the
Governor to the funds appropriated. The law further provides that the
statement of intent may give additional direction to executive agencies
respecting the purpose, objectives, spending philosophy, and restric-
tions associated with individual appropriations; however, the state-
ment of intent is not law. 88
Although the Legislature has the exclusive authority to appropriate
funds, the Governor has both statutory and constitutional roles in the
appropriations process. His statutory powers and duties include sub-
mitting a recommended budget to the Legislature.89 The Governor
also has a constitutional line item veto authority for general appropri-
ations acts in Florida. 90 The Governor, however, may not veto a quali-
fication or restriction without Vetoing the appropriation to which it
relates .91
86. Three primary elements constitute appropriations bills. The first is the allocation itself,
i.e., the amount the Legislature appropriates for each identified program or entity. The second is
the Summary Statement of Intent, which is included as part of the same document as the Gen-
eral Appropriations Act, which sets the allocations. The Summary Statement of Intent appears
as a column comparing the Governor's Amended Budget Recommendations to the funds actu-
ally appropriated for the ensuing fiscal year. The third is the Implementing Bill, which imple-
ments and administers the General Appropriations Act. In effect, the Implementing Bill makes
substantive law that is not allowed in the General Appropriations Act. Brown v. Firestone, 382
So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1980); Graham v. Firestone, No.82-1703 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 1982).
87. FLA. STAT. § 216.177(l)(c) (1991).
88. Id.
89. FLA. CONST. art. III, §8(a).
90. Id.
91. Id. This, in some instances, may present a difficult choice for the Governor. If the
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As a comprehensive means of setting policy while reflecting legisla-
tive will, the appropriations process does have limitations. One diffi-
culty with the system lies in its complexity. Typically, Florida's
General Appropriations Act is hundreds of pages long and encom-
passes thousands of line items. Unlike general bills that deal with a
single subject,92 the appropriations bill deals with scores of subjects,
issues, and policies. For these reasons, the General Appropriations
Act is less accessible to the individual legislative member as a means
of articulating public policy choices. Few members of the Legislature
can become intimately familiar with the multiple facets of any general
appropriations bill without risk of neglecting other important legisla-
tive duties. As a necessary consequence, many of the policy decisions
inherent in the budget are made by a small percentage of each house's
membership. 9
As demonstrated by the discussions herein, each of the legislative
oversight and control mechanisms has attendant drawbacks or limita-
tions. Yet, when considered as a whole rather than individually, these
mechanisms represent an effective means through which the Legisla-
ture oversees the delegation of powers to the executive branch. As will
be seen from the history of the legislative veto in Florida, 94 it is appar-
ent that the Legislature seeks more effective tools for overseeing and
containing executive branch rulemaking.
Legislature imposes its will to restrict or qualify an administrative program through appropria-
tions proviso language, the Governor may veto it. In doing so, however, he is also vetoing the
appropriation for the program itself. Presumably, the Governor also may exercise his line item
veto to strike proviso language that he finds offensive in areas which compel appropriations for
the protection of the public health, safety, or welfare. In these instances, the Legislature is left
with the choice of overriding the Governor's veto, or reappropriating the needed funding with-
out the offending proviso.
92. Article III, section 6 of the Florida Constitution requires that "[elvery law shall em-
brace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith." FLA. CONST. art. III, §6.
93. The House of Representatives and the Senate develop budget documents separately.
Although both are loosely based on the Governor's recommendation, each reflects various levels
of commitment to priorities of the leadership and membership of each respective house. Usually,
the House and Senate general appropriations bills do not agree when they are passed by the
respective houses. In an effort to reach a budget agreement, each house's leadership assigns a
few individual members to participate in a conference committee. FLA. S. RULE 1.5 (1993); FLA.
H.R. RurI 6.58 (1993). When the conference committee agrees, the membership of the confer-
ence committee reports the recommended final budget product to their respective houses. FLA. S.
RULE 4.5 (1993); FiA. H.R. RULE 6.59 (1993). Because this "conference committee report" re-
flects the agreement of the conferees, each respective house is limited in its prerogatives with
respect to the report. Neither house may amend the report, but may only approve or reject it. Id.
If the report is rejected, the conference committee resumes its work. Thus, important policf
decisions are made apart from the legislative membership as a whole. Further, the membership
as a whole is unable to amend the bill without nullifying the consensus built between the houses.
94. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
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III. FLORIDA'S EFFORT TO CONTAIN AGENCY RULEMAKING
While the means of oversight and control employed by the Legisla-
ture are extensive, evidence exists that the Legislature is not com-
pletely satisfied with these methods. In part, this dissatisfaction has
been expressed since the adoption of the Administrative Procedure
Act in 197491 by the introduction of numerous bills in attempts to in-
crease the level of legislative oversight and to authorize the legislative
veto of administrative rules.96 These bills have taken different forms
and experienced varying levels of success. On the whole, however, the
number and variety of bills introduced indicate that the Legislature
continues to be interested in new methods of legislative oversight of
administrative rulemaking and the concept of the legislative veto of
administrative rules.
Legislation introduced in Florida to increase legislative oversight of
administrative rulemaking generally falls into three categories: (1) leg-
islation that imposes stricter guidelines for rule adoption and attempts
to increase agency adherence to statutory intent;9 (2) legislation which
increases legislative committee oversight in the area of rule adoption;9s
and (3) bills or joint resolutions which seek to impose statutorily or
constitutionally the concept of the legislative veto of agency rules. 99
Some legislative proposals contain elements that fall into more than
one of the categories. Legislative veto proposals consist of two basic
types: (1) those which would allow the Legislature to nullify proposed
or existing rules; and (2) those that would require that every agency
rule be ratified by the Legislature before becoming effective.
Among the proposals designed to impose stricter guidelines on rule
adoption and increase adherence to legislative intent was House Bill
535, which was introduced in 1983.'00 This bill proposed that agencies
be prohibited from adopting any rule except where the Legislature had
"enacted a specific statute relating to the specific subject matter of the
rule." 1 It would appear that the bill purported to require more spe-
cific authority in a legislative delegation than was the prevailing prac-
tice. In effect, however, the language of the bill probably was no more
than a statement of the constitutional requirements for a legislative
delegation to an agency of the executive branch. 10 2 Moreover, under
95. Ch. 74-310, 1974 Fla. Laws 952 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 120.50-.71 (1975)).
96. Infra notes 100-206 and accompanying text.
97. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
98. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
99. See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
100. Fla. HB 535 (1983).
101. Id.
102. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
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chapter 120, Florida Statutes, the promulgating administrative agency
must specifically determine and provide notice of the specific statu-
tory authority under which the rule is being adopted. 03 The JAPC
then must review this determination in its required evaluation of pro-
posed rules. 11 House Bill 535 was never heard in committee and died
at the end of the 1983 legislative session. 03
Two other bills relating to executive agency rulemaking centered on
the legislative intent expressed or implied in the enabling law. House
Bill 812106 and Senate Bill 319,' °0 introduced in 1985, both prohibited
executive agencies from adopting rules that directly contravened
the latest expression of the intent of the Legislature as evidenced by
the defeat of a proposal seeking enactment of such practice,
procedure, or requirement. However, no such defeat of a proposal
shall be considered the latest expression of the intent of the
Legislature where a later action of either house of the Legislature, or
any committee or subcommittee thereof, reverses such defeat or
otherwise revives such proposal. 08
At best, it would have been difficult to comply with this requirement.
Indeed, it would have required a subjective analysis of legislative ac-
tions and vigilant attention to legislative debate and history, rather
than focusing attention on the language of the enabling law. House
Bill 812 died in the House Committee on Judiciary,'09 and the Senate
Committee on Governmental Operations killed Senate Bill 319.110
Apart from restrictions on the agencies' rulemaking endeavors, pro-
posals to increase legislative committee oversight of executive agency
rulemaking also have been introduced. These proposals usually re-
quired executive agencies to submit proposed rules to legislative com-
103. FA. STAT. § 120.54(7) (Supp. 1992).
104. Id. § 120.545(1).
105. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEoISATION, 1983 REGULAR SESSIOn, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS
at 173, HB 535.
106. Fla. HB 812 (1984).
107. Fla. SB 319 (1985).
108. Fla. HB 812 (1984); Fla. SB 319 (1985). The bills also provided:
Whenever an act of the Legislature is enacted which contains any provision which is in
direct conflict with, or otherwise supersedes, a rule, or any portion thereof, adopted
by an agency within the executive branch of state government, upon the effective date
of such act, said rule or the applicable portion thereof shall be void and inoperative
and of no further force or effect.
Id. The need for this provision is unclear, given that it is a basic statement of constitutional law.
109. FLA. LEOIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1984 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HousE BILLS
at 265, HB 812.
110. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1985 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS
at 45, SB 319.
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mittees for review. In 1981, Committee Substitute for House Bills 181
and 473"' proposed that enabling statutes require that every proposed
rule be referred to the "appropriate committee in each house of the
Legislature for review and comment as to compliance with the legisla-
tive intent." If the "appropriate committee" were to determine that
the proposed rule was in conflict with the legislative intent as ex-
pressed in the enabling statute, and the agency refused to modify,
amend, withdraw, or repeal" 2 the rule, the committee would have
been required to file its comments with the Department of State. The
bill would have directed the Department of State to publish the com-
mittee's commentary in the Florida Administrative Weekly."' In addi-
tion, the bill would have required the Department to publish, as a
note accompanying the subject rule in the Florida Administrative
Code, a summary of the committee's comments and a reference to the
issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly that contained the full
committee commentary." 4
The bill neither defined the term "appropriate committee," nor did
it appear to limit the referral of a proposed rule to only one "appro-
priate committee.""' 5 The committee substitute would not have altered
the role of the JAPC."6 Presumably, the procedure for review by the
"appropriate committee" was meant to augment the JAPC review
process, not supplant it. 117 Both the statutory JAPC procedure"18 and
111. Fla. CS for HBs 181 and 473 (1981). House Bill 473, prior to being included in the
combined committee substitute (Committee Substitute for House Bills 181 and 473), was effec-
tively a legislative veto bill which required approval of all proposed rules by an appropriate
committee in each house. See infra notes 121-136 and accompanying text.
112. Presumably, the word "repeal" was inappropriately included in the list of available
agency actions, as the committee substitute only concerned proposed administrative rules, not
adopted administrative rules. See CS for HBs 181 and 473 (1981).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Presumably, the noted commentary to accompany a filed rule in the Florida Adminis-
trative Code could have contained summaries of the comments of more than one "appropriate
committee."
116. House Bill 181, as originally filed, prior to being combined with House Bill 473 in the
combined committee substitute, would have modified the role of the JAPC and, like House Bill
473, would have authorized a legislative veto. See discussion of House Bill 473 supra note I11.
Under the original House Bill 181, the JAPC would have recommended legislative invalidation
of a rule which exceeded statutory authority, conflicted with another rule, or conflicted with the
legislative intent of the enabling statute. The invalidation would have taken place through con-
current resolution of the Legislature. Fla. HB 181 (1981).
117. The JAPC is a joint legislative committee, see FLA. STAT. § 11.60 (1991), whereas the
"appropriate committees" contemplated by Committee Substitute for House Bills 181 and 473
are specified to be "of each house." Fla. CS for HBs 181 and 473 (1981). Therefore, the JAPC
would not have been considered an "appropriate committee" in terms of fulfilling the bill's
directives.
118. See FLA. STAT. § 120.545 (1991).
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the procedure contemplated by Committee Substitute for House Bills
181 and 473 would have resulted only in footnotes in the Florida Ad-
ministrative Code, rather than invalidation of the subject rule. Pre-
sumably, no substantial consequences would have resulted from
differing conclusions by the JAPC and an "appropriate committee"
on a proposed rule. The combined bill did little more than bring the
substantive legislative committees, as contrasted with the JAPC, into
the rule review process. While this would have increased legislative
oversight of executive rulemaking, it would have duplicated the exist-
ing JAPC rule review process. The combined bill died on the 1981
Calendar of the House of Representatives."19
Bills substantially similar to Committee Substitute for House Bills
181 and 473 were filed in subsequent years, but likewise did not be-
come law. 120 One of these bills, Senate Bill 921,111 passed the Legisla-
ture, but was vetoed by the Governor. I'2 The bill's provisions and the
reasons expressed for the veto warrant examination.
The enacted version of Senate Bill 921, which had been amended in
the Senate Committee on Governmental Operations," 3 related to "ap-
propriate committee" review and comment of proposed rules. 1' The
final version of the bill also amended section 120.54, Florida Statutes,
which had long specified that no agency has inherent rulemaking au-
thority. 25 The amendment added that no agency has authority to
adopt any rule unless the Legislature has enacted "a specific statute
relating to the specific subject matter" of the rule.' u
Governor Bob Graham's veto message specified that the bill was
objectionable in part because it granted to legislative committees the
power to make determinations orf legislative intent. 27 He found this
irfconsistent with the Florida Constitution's'28 vesting of legislative
power in the whole of the Legislature and not "a select group of legis-
119. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1981 REGULAR SESSION. HISTORY OF HOUSE BIts
at 49, CS for HBs 181 and 473.
120. See, e.g., Fla. HB 2 (1982); Fla. SB 738 (1982); Fla. SB 921 (1982); Fla. HB 252 (1983).
121. Fla. SB 921 (1982).
122. FLA. LEaIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1982 REouLAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BLLs
at 290, SB 921.
123. FLA. S. JouR. 270 (Reg. Sess. Mar. 1, 1982).
124. Fla. SB 921 (1982).
125. Id.
126. Id. This provision was included in House Bill 535, discussed in this section, see supra
note 100 and accompanying text.
127. Veto Message of Governor Bob Graham, Fla. SB 921 (1982) (available at Fla. Dep't of
State, Div of Archives, ser. 227, carton 30, Tallahassee, Fla.).
128. FLA. CONST. art. ir, §1.
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lators."1 29 Furthermore, the veto message questioned the appropriate-
ness of substantive committees declaring opinions concerning
legislative intent for a particular enactment, rather than allowing the
expression of intent to be gleaned from the words of the statute. 30
The Governor further found the bill ambiguous because it did not
specify a method for determining the "appropriate committee" in
each house or identify who would make the determination. 3' The
Governor considered the lack of specific time frames to be problem-
atic in that this could have resulted in agency reliance on the filed rule
prior to receiving a negative commentary from a legislative commit-
tee. 132 The Governor also stated: "The possibility also exists that the
Senate and House committees asked to review a rule could make dif-
ferent interpretations of the rule's compliance with legislative intent.
This would cause confusion to those who must comply with agency
rules and would undermine public confidence in State government.""'
The Governor recited in his veto message that the JAPC's responsi-
bility "adequately addresses the need for legislative oversight into the
rulemaking procedures utilized by the Executive Branch." 134 The Gov-
ernor followed by noting that this type of legislative review would be
costly,'35 which was unjustified given the "marginally useful and po-
tentially detrimental" scheme contemplated by the bill. 3 6
The Governor also had objections to the amendment to section
120.54 that would have limited an agency's authority to those situa-
tions where the Legislature had enacted a specific statute: "This
[amendment] is totally unnecessary because the Administrative Proce-
dure Act already requires an agency to identify its rulemaking author-
ity and the specific statute implemented for each rule proposed."'' 37
The Governor continued: "Further, the language utilized in [the
amendment] may have a negative effect upon the efficient operation
of our agencies by virtue of unnecessarily encumbering the delibera-
tive rulemaking process."' 3 The Legislature took no action to over-
ride the veto. 13 9
129. Veto Message of Governor Bob Graham, Fla. SB 921 (1982) (available at Fla. Dep't of










139. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1982 SpEcl. SEssIoN "F", HISTORY OF SENATE
BILLS at 290, SB 921.
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An attempt was made to address some of the Governor's concerns
in at least one subsequently-filed bill. House Bill 252,140 filed in 1983,
clearly specified that the presiding officer would refer proposed rules
to select or standing committees in each respective house, rather than
to the "appropriate committee" contemplated in Senate Bill 921.141
Perhaps in response to the Governor's concern that time frames
should be specified, House Bill 252 provided that, if the review and
comment by the committee were not accomplished within thirty days
after referral, the committee would have been deemed to have ap-
proved the rule.142 An agency would have had sixty days to modify,
withdraw, or repeal the rule before the committee objections were
filed with the Department of State. "3 House and Senate Rules would
have established methods for review and comment.'"
Other aspects of the Governor's previous objections were not ad-
dressed in House Bill 252 and, in at least one case, the bill's provisions
exacerbated some of the Governor's noted objections. The bill pro-
vided that committee review and comment could have been "effected
by the chairman in lieu of a meeting of the committee."' 145 This provi-
sion went even further than Senate Bill 921, which, as the Governor
characterized it, improperly granted the authority to determine legisla-
tive intent to individual committees ("a select group of legisla-
tors"). 146 House Bill 252 was indefinitely postponed in its first
committee of reference.147
In addition to increasing legislative review of agency rules, the Leg-
islature has expressed an interest in various forms of the legislative
veto. Forms of the legislative veto that would have provided for nulli-
fication or ratification of administrative rules have been considered in
numerous pieces of legislation.
Senate Bill 457148 proposed that the JAPC be required to
"[r]ecommend the adoption, amendment, or rejection of rules when,
in the course of its review of an agency's rules, the committee deter-
mines that the agency's rules are incomplete, inconsistent, or other-
140. Fla. HB 252 (1983).
141. Fla. SB 921 (1982).




146. Veto Message of Governor Bob Graham, Fla. SB 921 (1982) (available at Fla. Dep't of
State, Div. of Archives, ser. 227, carton 30, Tallahassee, Fla.).
147. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1983 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS
at 83, HB 252.
148. Fla. SB 457 (1981).
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wise deficient.' ' 49 Senate Bill 457 would have deleted the JAPC's
statutory standing to seek judicial review of rule objections. Addition-
ally, the JAPC would have been authorized to recommend that the
Legislature adopt a concurrent resolution invalidating a proposed rule
if the committee found that the rule exceeded statutory authority,
conflicted with another rule, or conflicted with the legislative intent. 150
The bill also would have empowered the Legislature to adopt a con-
current resolution invalidating or modifying a proposed rule during
the regular session. 5' The Department of State would have been re-
quired to publish the resolution in the Florida Administrative
Weekly." 2 Furthermore, the bill would have prohibited an agency
from proceeding with a proposed rule that was inconsistent with the
resolution." 3
Between legislative sessions, the JAPC would have been empow-
ered, through a two-thirds vote of its membership, to suspend a rule
that exceeded statutory authority, conflicted with another rule, or
conflicted with the legislative intent of the statute upon which the rule
was based. 5 4 The suspension would have been effective until the Leg-
islature adopted a concurrent resolution invalidating or modifying the
rule, or until the end of the next session, whichever would have oc-
curred earlier. 55 If the Legislature did not adopt a concurrent resolu-
tion invalidating or modifying a proposed rule, the agency would have
been authorized to proceed with adoption.'56
In addition, section 120.545, Florida Statutes, which provides for
the JAPC review of agency rules, 17 would have been amended by Sen-
ate Bill 457 to specify that the JAPC could suspend a proposed or
existing rule that had not been modified, withdrawn, repealed, or
amended to meet the JAPC's objection. 5 The bill would have re-
quired the Department of State to publish a notice of the suspension
149. Id. Likewise, House Bill 181, as originally filed in 1981, similarly would have aug-
mented the role of the JAPC. House Bill 181 was combined with House Bill 473 into Committee
Substitute for House Bills 181 and 473, which removed any reference to the JAPC and removed
any legislative veto provision. See discussion of Committee Substitute for House Bills 181 and
473, this section, supra. With respect to Senate Bill 457, presumably the intent was not to en-
courage the committee to recommend adoption of a rule if inconsistent, or otherwise deficient,








157. FLA. STAT. § 120.545 (1991).
158. Fla. SB 457 (1981).
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in the Florida Administrative Weekly, and provide notice of the ob-
jection as a history note in the Florida Administrative Code.5 9 Senate
Bill 457 died in the Committee on Governmental Operations. 160
In 1981, the Legislature considered two proposals for a constitu-
tional amendment that would have established a legislative veto.
House Joint Resolution 739161 proposed the creation of article III, sec-
tion 19 of the Florida Constitution. The constitutional amendment
would have authorized the Legislature to amend, suspend, or repeal
any executive agency administrative rule that exceeded delegated legis-
lative authority or conflicted with another rule. 62 The proposed joint
resolution contained no reference for review by the JAPC or any com-
mittee of jurisdiction. 163
Likewise, Senate Joint Resolution 472 6'4 proposed a constitutional
amendment to article I, section 18 of the Florida Constitution, au-
thorizing the Legislature to nullify executive agency rules. Specifically,
the resolution would have allowed any rule of the executive branch to
be nullified by concurrent resolution of the Legislature, or to be sus-
pended as provided by law on the grounds that the rule was without,
or was in excess of, delegated legislative authority. 165 A majority vote
of the Governor and Cabinet, however, could have deferred the sus-
pension of a rule until the Legislature acted upon it.66 Under the pro-
visions of the joint resolution, if the Legislature did not disapprove a
suspension of a rule at the next regular session, the suspended rule
automatically would have been reinstated. 67 Neither House Joint Res-
olution 739 nor Senate Joint Resolution 472 survived the committee
159. Id.
160. FLA. LEOIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1981 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS
at 151, SB 457. A legislative veto also was proposed in 1981 by House Bill 473 as originally filed.
The bill provided that no agency could adopt or promulgate a rule until (1) it submitted a request
for adoption of the rule to each house of the Legislature; (2) the requested rule had been referred
to the appropriate committee in each house; and (3) the appropriate committee in each house
had approved the rule or had approved an amended version of the rule. Fla. HB 473 (1981). The
bill also specified legislative intent that the responsibility for approving rules remain with the
Legislature since rules are the final expression of the will of the Legislature in adopting the
enabling legislation. Id. The bill was combined with House Bill 181 into Committee Substitute
for House Bills 181 and 473, which removed the legislative veto aspect. See supra notes 111-116
and accompanying text.
161. Fla. HJR 739 (1981) (proposed FLA. CONST. art. Il1, § 19).
162. Id.
163. Id. An identical joint resolution-House Joint Resolution 3-was filed in 1982. It was
referred to the House Committee on Governmental Operations, where it died. FLA. LEGIS., HIS-
TORY OF LEGISLATION, 1982 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 1, HJR 3.
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process. The former died in the House Committee on Governmental
Operations 168 and the latter died in the Senate Committee on Rules
and Calendar. 169
Another legislative proposal to establish the legislative veto may be
of interest, if for no other reason than the fact that it was so recently
considered. This proposal, filed in 1992, was an amendment to Senate
Joint Resolution 766.170 The amendment to the joint resolution,
adopted by the Senate Committee on Appropriations, proposed a con-
stitutional amendment authorizing the Legislature to veto a proposed
administrative rule or repeal an adopted administrative rule by con-
current resolution adopted by three-fifths vote of the membership of
each house.' 7 ' Because the amended bill was in the form of a concur-
rent resolution for a constitutional amendment, it would not have
been presented to the Governor if the Legislature had adopted it. 1 2
Furthermore, had the Legislature adopted it and the electorate ap-
proved it, the amendment would have authorized legislative vetoes of
administrative rules by concurrent resolution, which similarly would
not have been presented to the Governor.173 The bill as amended,
however, died on the Senate Special Order Calendar on the last day of
the 1992 Regular Session. 74
These proposals to establish a legislative veto were not novel ideas
when introduced. In fact, in 1976, an amendment referendum to es-
tablish a legislative veto was placed before the electors for ratification
at the general election. 175 At the same time, the Legislature passed a
bill that would have implemented the constitutional amendment if rat-
ified.176
Committee Substitute for Senate Joint Resolutions 619 and 1398177
would have amended article I, section 18 of the Florida Constitution
to permit the Legislature, by concurrent resolution, to nullify or sus-
168. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1981 REouLAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HousE Buis
at 206, HJR 739.
169. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1981 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE Buis
at 152, SJR 472.
170. FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BiL INFORMATION, 1992 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF
SENATE BILLS at 83, SJR 766; FLA. S. JoUR. 1418 (Reg. Sess. Mar. 12, 1992).
171. Fla. S. Comm. on Approp., Amendment I to SJR 766 (1992) (on file with comm.)
(proposed FLA. CONST. art. 11, § 19).
172. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 8(a).
173. Id.
174. FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BIL INFORMATION, 1992 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF
SENATE BItS at 83, SJR 766.
175. Fla. Dep't of State, Div of Elections, tabulation of official records of the general elec-
tion (Nov. 2, 1976) (on file with division).
176. CS for SJRs 619 and 1398, at 1 (1976) (proposed FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 18).
177. Id.
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pend any administrative rule of an executive branch agency on the
grounds that it was either without, or was in excess of, delegated legis-
lative authority. 78 The Governor and Cabinet could have, by majority
vote, deferred the suspension of the rule until the Legislature acted
upon it. 79 Failure of the Legislature to disapprove the suspension at
the next regular session automatically would have reinstated the
rule. 180
Contemporaneous with the passage of its proposal for the constitu-
tional amendment, the Legislature passed a proposed enabling law.18
The statutory proposal was contained in Committee Substitute for
Senate Bill 1384.82 Under the bill, if the JAPC objected to a rule of
an executive agency, and the agency refused to modify, amend, with-
draw, or repeal the rule within thirty days of receipt of the JAPC
objection, the operation of the rule would have been suspended upon
published notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly.'83 The bil
would have required the JAPC to report all suspended rules to the
Legislature, stating JAPC objections with particularity, thirty days
prior to the commencement of each legislative session.'8
The Legislature would have considered the objection of the JAPC
and, by concurrent resolution, approved or disapproved the subject
rule. 8 5 If the Legislature were to have failed to disapprove the rule,
the suspension would have been lifted by operation of law and the
rule would have been effective within five days of the Legislature's
vote on the rule."16
On June 29, 1976, Governor Reubin Askew vetoed the bill.8 7 In his
veto message, the Governor discussed both the proposed constitu-
tional amendment and the enabling bill, stating:
[Tihe proposed constitutional amendment [would] seriously erode
our traditional system of checks and balances which results from the
separation of the branches of government....
It would jeopardize the rights of the individual citizen through an




181. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1976 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILS
at 386, CS for SB 1384.





187. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1976 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS
at 386, CS for SB 1384.
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branches. To a great extent, it would place those rights in the hands
of a growing legislative bureaucracy....
Our system already provides a remedy against overreaching by
executive rulemaking. Under the Administrative Procedures [sic]
Act, any affected person may seek an administrative determination
of the validity of an executive rule on the ground that the rule is an
invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. A decision must be
rendered upon such a question by an administrative hearing officer
within thirty days. The decision of the hearing officer is immediately
reviewable by the judicial system. The individual citizen enjoys the
procedural protections of notice, a public hearing, and a written
record. "Is
The Governor's veto message characterized the committee substi-
tute as offering none of the safeguards available under then-existing
law. 89 Furthermore, the Governor's veto noted that determinations of
whether a rule exceeds legislative authority are "complex and gener-
ally hotly contested."' 90 The veto message contrasted the extant sys-
tem of review by an impartial hearing officer with the process
contemplated by the bill, which "would [have] substitute[d] the politi-
cal forum of a legislative committee.' 9
The Governor noted in his veto message that the Legislature already
had the power to amend law and nullify an agency's rulemaking ef-
fort.'9 He characterized the bill as an effort to "sidestep the role of
the Governor in the lawmaking process."'' 9 Governor Askew also
questioned whether the judiciary could have reviewed a legislative de-
cision to nullify a rule:
If the constitution, as a result of the proposed amendment, states
that the Legislature may nullify a rule on the specific ground that the
rule is without authority, the judiciary may not be in a posture to
review that decision. There would be nothing to insure that the rule
188. Veto Message of Governor Reubin Askew, Fla. CS for SB 1384 (1976) (available at Fla.
Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 866, carton 13, Tallahassee, Fla.).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. On this point, the veto message stated:
For example, assume that in question is a Department of Environmental Regulation
rule on water quality. A developer with a strong monetary interest may wish to chal-
lenge the rule as outside the scope of legislative authority. Nearby homeowners may
demand the protection of the rule. Instead of a structured legal proceeding where both
sides have their opportunity to present argument, the proposed process would allow






was nullified because of lack of authority rather than a policy
disagreement with the rule. 194
The veto message concluded that the proposed constitutional
amendment and implementing legislation represented: "an experiment
in government foreign to our tradition of checks and balances, sup-
planting the role of the judiciary and moving the legislative branch far
into the arena of executive administration of law. The amendment
would be inconsistent with the basic structure of the Florida Constitu-
tion. " 91 The Legislature took no action to override the Governor's
veto of Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 1384.96 Moreover, the
constitutional amendment proposed by Senate Joint Resolution for
Senate Bills 619 and 1398 was defeated in the general election.
197
Another type of legislative veto that has been proposed in Florida i's
one that, rather than authorizing veto or nullification of proposed or
existing rules, would require legislative ratification before an adminis-
trative rule becomes effective. While this type of proposal has not
been common, it is represented in one of the most recent proposals.
Senate Bill 824,198 introduced in 1992, would have revised the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act to require legislative approval or adoption
of all agency rules. The bill would have required all proposed rules to
be submitted to the JAPC. The committee would have prepared re-
commendations and statements in support of the recommendations,
and prepared and submitted bills authorizing rules for adoption by the
Legislature.'" In addition to a number of other requirements, the
JAPC would have reviewed all proposed agency rules and, at its dis-
cretion, held public hearings. The JAPC's review would have in-
cluded, but would not have been limited to, a determination of
whether the agency had exceeded its statutory authority, whether the
proposed rule was in conformity with the intent of the enabling legis-
lation, and whether the rule conflicted with any provision of chapter
120 or rule of another agency. 200
Further, Senate Bill 824 would have required the JAPC to deter-
mine whether the proposed rule was necessary to fully accomplish the
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. FLA. LEGis., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1976 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS
at 386, CS for SB 1384.
197. Fla. Dep't. of State, Div. of Elections, tabulation of official records of the general
election (Nov. 2, 1976) (on file with division). The vote of the electorate was 1,210,001 opposed
and 729,400 in favor.
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objectives of the enabling statute, whether the proposed rule was rea-
sonable (particularly as it would affect the convenience of the public
or other affected persons), whether the proposed rule could be made
less complex or more understandable to the public, and whether the
proposed rule was otherwise in compliance with law. 201 Following its
review, the JAPC would have been required to recommend whether
the Legislature should authorize the agency to adopt the rule, whether
the Legislature should adopt the rule with amendments, or whether
the rule should be withdrawn.3
Upon the recommendation of the JAPC that a rule be authorized
by the Legislature, the JAPC staff would have drafted a bill authoriz-
ing the agency to adopt all or part of the rule, and incorporating any
amendments the JAPC wished the rule to include. 203 Any draft bill
prepared would have been required to contain a legislative finding
that the rule was within the legislative intent of the enabling statute
which the rule was intended to implement, extend, apply, or inter-
pret.204 If the Legislature were to fail to act upon all or part of a pro-
posed rule submitted to it, no agency thereafter would be authorized
to issue or take action to implement any rule unless legislatively au-
thorized to do so. 205 The Senate Committee on Governmental Opera-
tions reported the bill favorably, but it died in the Senate Committee
on Rules and Calendar.20
It is evident from the foregoing that the Legislature has been, and
continues to be, engaged in a search for appropriate additional meth-
ods of legislative oversight of executive rulemaking. The search has
included proposals for improving adherence to enabling law, increas-
ing legislative committee oversight, and imposing the legislative veto.
IV. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN CHADHA, AND CASES
FROM OTHER STATES
While numerous attempts have been made in Florida to establish
some form of legislative veto, thus far they have not been successful.





205. Id. The provisions of the bill were cumbersome at best and impracticable at worst. For
a more complete understanding of the bill, refer to the bill itself and to the Senate Staff Analysis
and Economic Impact Statement. Staff of Fla. S. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., SB 824 (1992) Staff
Analysis (1992) (on file with comm.).
206. FLA. LEGIS., FINAL LEoSLArVE BILL INFoRaMAION, 1992 RcUI.AR SESSION, HISTORY OF
SENATE BELLS at 87, SB 824.
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been vetoed by the Governor or, in the case of attempts to amend the
Florida Constitution, did not pass or were rejected by the electors. As
a result, there is no Florida case law on the subject of the legislative
veto. Other states and the federal courts, however, have examined
various legislative veto mechanisms. An examination of some of these
cases is beneficial to an understanding of the issues raised by the con-
cept of the legislative veto.
The United States Supreme Court considered the legislative veto in
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha.2w At issue in
Chadha was the constitutionality of the one-house Congressional veto
of the United States Attorney General's decision not to deport a resi-
dent alien under the Immigration and Nationality Act. 208 In its analy-
sis of the veto provision, the Chadha Court discussed the separation
of powers:
The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new
Federal Government into three defined categories, Legislative,
Executive, and Judicial, to assure, as nearly as possible, that each
branch of government would confine itself to its assigned
responsibility. The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the
separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to
accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted.
Although not "hermetically" sealed from one another, the powers
delegated to the three Branches are functionally identifiable. When
any Branch acts, it is presumptively exercising the power the
Constitution has delegated to it. When the Executive acts, it
presumptively acts in an executive or administrative capacity ....
And when, as here, one House of Congress purports to act, it is
presumptively acting within its assigned sphere. 2 9
The constitutional inquiry confronting the Chadha Court was
whether the presentment and bicameral principles of article I, section
7 of the United States Constitution 21 0 were violated. The Court found
207. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
208. The congressional veto provision, at section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and National-
ity Act, codified at 8 U.S.C.S. § 1254(c)(2) (1987), authorized the Senate or the House of Repre-
sentatives to pass a resolution stating that it does not favor the suspension or the deportation of
the resident alien, whereupon the Attorney General was directed to deport the alien or authorize
the alien's voluntary departure under an order of deportation.
209. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951-52.
210. Article I, section 7 of the United States Constitution provides, in part, "Every Bill
which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a
Law, be presented to the President of the United States .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House
of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be
19931
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the presentment pro-vision to be designed "to check whatever propen-
sity a particular Congress might have to enact oppressive, improvi-
dent, or ill-considered measures .... ,"2 The Court found the
Constitution's bicameralism requirement to be interdependent with
the presentment requirement. 2 2 It found that the bicameralism re-
quirement, which requires that laws have the concurrence of the pre-
scribed majority of both houses of Congress, ensures that legislation
is not enacted without careful consideration by the nation's elected
officials .213
The Court established that the procedural requirements of present-
ment and bicameralism apply to the legislative veto in question.1 4 The
Court stated:
The nature of the decision implemented by the one-House veto in
these cases further manifests its legislative character. After long
experience with the clumsy, time-consuming private bill procedure,
Congress made a deliberate choice to delegate to the Executive
Branch, and specifically to the Attorney General, the authority to
allow deportable aliens to remain in this country in certain specified
circumstances. It is not disputed that this choice to delegate authority
is precisely the kind of decision that can be implemented only in
accordance with the procedures set out in Art I. Disagreement with
the Attorney General's decision on Chadha's deportation-that is,
Congress' decision to deport Chadha-no less than Congress'
original choice to delegate to the Attorney General the authority to
make that decision, involves determinations of policy that Congress
can implement in only one way; bicameral passage followed by
presentment to the President. Congress must abide by its delegation
of authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked. 21s
The Court found that the action by one house of Congress did not
fall within any of the expressed constitutional exceptions to the bica-
meralism requirement 2 6 and thus struck the legislative veto provision
as violative of the United States Constitution.
presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect,
shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two
thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limita-
tions prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
211. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,947-48 (1983).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 948-49.
214. Id. at 952.
215. Id. at 954-55.
216. Id. at 959.
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Justice Byron White filed a vigorous dissent in which he concluded
that the ruling invalidating the legislative veto required Congress
either to refrain from delegating necessary authority, leaving itself
with a hopeless task of writing laws with the requisite specificity to;
cover endless special circumstances across the entire policy
landscape, or in the alternative, to abdicate its lawmaking function
to the Executive Branch and independent agencies. To choose the
former leaves major national problems unresolved; to opt for the
latter risks unaccountable policy-making by those not elected to fill
that role.2 17
Justice White found other means to ensure executive accommodation
and accountability, including writing statutes with greater specificity
and engaging in oversight activities, to be insufficient and undesira-
ble.2 1 8
Justice White did not believe the legislative veto manifested an over-
reaching by the legislative branch to the detriment of the executive or
judicial branches. 2 9 Justice White stated:
The history of the legislative veto also makes clear that it has not
been a sword with which Congress has struck out to aggrandize itself
at the expense of the other branches. . . . Rather, the veto has been a
means of defense, a reservation of ultimate authority necessary if
Congress is to fulfill its designated role ... as the Nation's
lawmaker. While the President has often objected to particular
legislative vetoes, generally those left in the hands of congressional
Committees, the Executive has more often agreed to legislative
review as the price for a broad delegation of authority. To be sure,
the President may have preferred unrestricted power, but that could
be precisely why Congress thought it essential to retain a check on
the exercise of delegated authority.220
The dissent postulated that the power of the legislative veto is not
the power to write new law while circumventing bicameralism and pre-
sentment. " ' Justice White instead viewed the exercise as nothing more
than a reservation of legislative power that Congress originally was
not required to delegate. 2 2 He noted that, absent the veto, agencies
217. Id. at 968.
218. Id. at 972-73.
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receiving delegations of legislative power may themselves issue regula-
tions having the force of law without bicameral approval or executive
presentment. 2 3 Moreover, Justice White stated that the legislative veto
does not intrude upon the executive's constitutional function of exe-
cuting the law, as the veto conditions a legislative delegation and not a
constitutional power. 224 He concluded:
I do not suggest that all legislative vetoes are necessarily consistent
with separation-of-powers principles. A legislative check on an
inherently executive function, for example, that of initiating
prosecutions, poses an entirely different question. But the legislative
veto device here-and in many other settings-is far from an
instance of legislative tyranny over the Executive. It is a necessary
check on the unavoidably expanding power of the agencies, both
Executive and independent, as they engage in exercising authority
delegated by Congress. 22
Numerous state courts also have considered the issue raised by a
legislative veto of administrative rules.
In Legislative Research Commission v. Brown,226 the Kentucky Su-
preme Court held what it characterized as "legislative veto" provi-
sions to be unconstitutional as violative of the separation of powers
doctrine. The court used a strict review standard because the separa-
tion of powers doctrine had been found to be fundamental to Ken-
tucky's tripartite system of government. 227
The Kentucky statutory scheme granted to the Legislative Research
Commission (LRC) review authority over executive branch regula-
tions, and required administrative bodies to forward proposed regula-
tions to the LRC for review and approval. 228 The LRC was directed to
submit the regulation to one of its subcommittees to determine con-
formance with statutory authority and to determine whether it carried
out the legislative intent of enabling statutes. 229 The LRC either could
accept the subcommittee's recommendation or return the regulation
with its objections to the promulgating body. The administrative body
could revise the regulation to meet the objections, or return it without
change to the LRC.
230
223. Id. at 986-87.
224. Id. at 1000.
225. Id. at 1002.
226. Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984).
227. Id. at 912.





In the latter event, the regulation would be placed before the Ken-
tucky General Assembly. If the General Assembly were not in session,
objections by the LRC would delay the regulation until the next legis-
lative session. The Kentucky Supreme Court characterized this as a
"legislative veto" of the executive branch's administrative policy:
"The power to suspend a regulation's effective date for up to twenty-
one months is the power to effectively prevent a regulation from hav-
ing the force of law." 23'
The court noted that the subject statutes delivered the legislative
power into the hands of but a few members of the General Assembly,
namely, the membership of the LRC. 232 The court found the greatest
infirmity of the "legislative veto" to be in its effect on the separation
of powers, however. 233 The court iterated that the adoption of admin-
istrative regulations to implement legislative enactments is constitu-
tionally executive in nature. 234 The scheme in question was found to
constitute a legislative encroachment, to the point of usurpation, on
the powers of the executive branch and was held unconstitutional. 2 1
Perhaps as significant, although not analyzed as thoroughly, the
court found the scheme to encroach upon the judicial power:
It will also be recalled that the review of the regulations was for the
stated legislative purpose of determining if they comported with
statutory authority and if they carried out the legislative intent. It
requires no citation of authority to state unequivocally that such a
determination is a judicial matter and is within the purview of the
judiciary .236
The West Virginia scheme, held unconstitutional in State ex reL
Barker v. Manchin,23 7 was similar to Kentucky's mechanism. In West
Virginia, no agency rule or regulation would be effective until pre-
sented and approved by the statutorily-created Legislative Rule-Mak-
ing Review Committee. 28 The statutes in question required the
committee to submit the rules it reviewed to the Legislature, which
could, by concurrent resolution, sustain or reverse the committee's ac-
231. Id. at 918.
232. Id. at 918-19.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 919-20.
236. Id. at 919.
237. State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1981).
238. All members of the Legislative Rule-Making Review Committee were members of the
Legislature. Id. at 626.
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tion.29 The Legislature was required to take formal action on the
committee's action only if the rule concerned the implementation of a
federally subsidized or assisted program.m In that instance, the Legis-
lature was required to sustain formally the disapproval; otherwise, the
regulation would become effective.' l In all other cases, the court
found "inaction by the legislature constitutes tacit approval of the
Committee action." ' 2 Thus, with the one exception, the court found
that the committee's decision served as the final legislative veto of a
disapproved rule.343
The Manchin court found the doctrine of separation of powers to
be fundamental, and therefore applied a strict standard of review to
the challenged statutes, which it held unconstitutional.2" The court
stated that it was compelled to restrain one branch of government
from "imping[ing] upon the powers conferred upon another branch,"
unless the constitution "permitt[ed] such interference. 245
The court stated that, when the Legislature delegates its rulemaking
power to the executive, validly-promulgated rules of the executive
"take on the force of statutory law.'"' 6 Through the challenged sta-
tutes, however, the Manchin court found the Legislature to have at-
tempted to alter fundamentally this relationship:
In effect, the legislature abdicates in favor of the executive its power
to make rules and then asserts that because the rule-making power so
delegated is legislative in nature, it may step into the role of the
executive and disapprove or amend administrative regulations free
from the constitutional restraints on its power to legislate.24 7
This, the court found, allowed the West Virginia Legislature to act
"as something other than a legislative body to control the actions of
the other branches." 2 The court, finding this to be a direct conflict
with the separation of powers doctrine, stated that "[t]he power of





242. Id. at 627.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 630.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 631.
247. Id. at 633.
248. Id.
249. Id. (citing State v. Harden, 58 S.E. 715 (W. Va. 1907)).
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The court did not enunciate a complete prohibition on legislative
review, and indicated that in some instances, a system of legislative
review may be warranted. 250 It required that any review of administra-
tive rules, however, not violate the doctrine of separation of powers
or the system of checks and balances.25" '
The problem with the West Virginia scheme was that legislative ac-
tion was being exercised by less than the entire Legislature, which was
also the case in Legislative Research Commission v. Brown.2 2 The
West Virginia practice was objectionable because it violated the con-
stitutionally-mandated procedure for action by the Legislature
through bills. 2 3 The court analogized the legislative action contem-
plated by the subject statutes to the powers of the executive, which
highlighted the separation of powers infirmity:
The power of a small number of Committee members to approve or
disapprove otherwise validly promulgated administrative regulations,
and of the entire legislative body to sustain or to reverse such actions
either by concurrent resolution or by inertia, constitutes a legislative
veto power comparable to the authority vested in the Governor...
and reverses the constitutional concept of government whereby the
legislature enacts the law subject to the approval or the veto of the
Governor. 2 4
In Opinion of the Justices,255 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire
opined on the constitutionality of a proposed statute which (similar to
the Kentucky and West Virginia schemes) would have required that
administrative rules be approved or rejected by legislative committees.
Unlike the Kentucky and West Virginia courts, however, the New
Hampshire court stated that the creation of a legislative veto would
not be per se unconstitutional. Instead, the court found the proposed
legislative plan constitutionally objectionable on the narrower ground
that vesting legislative power in subdivisions of the Legislature did not
represent the "legislative Will.' 2 6 According to the court, the New
Hampshire Constitution vested the legislative power in the whole
body, and not in a part.25 7
250. Id.
251. Id. at 634-35.
252. 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984).
253. State ex rel. Barker v. Machin, 279 S.E.2d 622, 632 (W. Va. 1981).
254. Id.
255. Opinion of the J.J., 431 A.2d 783 (N.H. 1981).
256. Id. at 788.
257. Id.
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The New Hampshire court, however, expressed a level of sympathy
for the legislative endeavor to control agencies, and stated:
We believe that legislative supervision of administrative agencies
through constant statutory modification of their activities could be
cumbersome and ultimately be doomed to fail. Likewise, the indirect
supervision of administrative agencies through legislative budgetary
pressure, as well as the intense scrutiny of executive appointments, is
unsatisfactory. The increasing use of provisions allowing for
legislative veto of administrative lawmaking is a direct reflection of a
growing interest in more effective legislative supervision of agency
activities. 211
The court expounded on the legislative power in analyzing the "leg-
islative veto" with respect to separation of powers:
Rules and regulations promulgated by administrative agencies
pursuant to a valid delegation of authority have the force and effect
of laws. Lawmaking is primarily a legislative rather than an executive
function. The executive is responsible for the "faithful execution of
laws." Although the chief executive has discretion in performing his
duties, he has no authority to make laws. This being so, the
rulemaking authority of administrative agencies in the executive
branch derives solely from that power which the legislature delegates
to them. Because the legislature may delegate some of its lawmaking
authority to administrative agencies, it may properly condition the
exercise of that delegated authority upon its approval.259
Finally, the court found that the proposed statute did not violate
the separation of powers doctrine, but "actually buttresse[d] the un-
derlying delegation of rulemaking authority by restricting the extent to
which the executive branch can engage in unilateral lawmaking.''260
Rather than viewing the legislative veto as usurping the executive
power, as did the Kentucky court in Brown and the West Virginia
court in Manchin, the New Hampshire court viewed the legislative
veto as appropriately limiting the prerogatives of the executive
branch.26' In evaluating statutory schemes embodying the legislative
veto, the New Hampshire court appears to represent the minority
view, however.
258. Id. at 786-87 (citations omitted).
259. Id. at 787 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
260. Id. at 787-88 (emphasis added).
261. Id.
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A particularly extensive legislative veto power was evaluated in
State ex rel. Stephan v. Kansas House of Representatives.6 " The stat-
ute at issue authorized the Legislature to modify, reject, or revoke
administrative rules and regulations by concurrent resolution.2 63 The
Kansas Supreme Court struck the statute because it violated both the
separation of powers doctrine,'264 and the state constitution's present-
ment clause.26 To determine whether the Legislature was usurping the
Governor's powers, the court applied a four-factor analysis.
First, the court examined the nature of the power being exercised
and found it to be executive or administrative, not legislative.'" The
court found the power to be delegated to the executive branch by law,
and acknowledged that the Legislature could modify the grant of au-
thority to the executive, but only through "proper enactment of an-
other law."' 267
Secondly, the court looked to the degree of control sought to be
exercised by the Legislature over the executive, and found, under the
questioned "legislative veto" provisions:
[Tihe legislature has total and absolute control to modify, reject or
revoke any rules or regulations by concurrent resolution. There is no
provision allowing for presentment to the executive branch for
approval of the legislature's actions. As such, the executive branch
and the agencies involved have no control whatsoever over the
actions taken by the legislature in this regard.2'8
The third factor considered was the objective sought to be obtained
by the Legislature, and the fourth factor was the practical result of the
blending of powers as shown by actual experience. The court consid-
ered these factors as designed to achieve and, in fact, achieving a sin-
gular aim: "Here the apparent objective and result actually
accomplished is the control by the legislature over the adoption of
rules and regulations by administrative agencies and the exclusion of
participation by the executive branch in this area. "269
The court thus found the Kansas legislative veto provisions uncon-
stitutional because they significantly interfered with the activities of
262. State ex rel. Stephan v. Kansas House of Representatives, 687 P.2d 622 (Kan. 1984).
263. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-426 (Supp. 1983).
264. Not expressly provided in the Kansas Constitution, but a doctrine implicit in the three-
branch structure of government. See State ex rel. Stephan, 687 P.2d at 634.
265. Id. at 635-36.
266. Id. at 635.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 635-36.
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the executive branch and unconstitutionally usurped its powers.2 70 Cit-
ing Chadha,2 71 the Kansas court held that a resolution "must comply
with the enactment provisions of the constitution" before the resolu-
tion is a proper use of legislative power when the resolution "affects
the legal rights, duties and regulations of persons outside the legisla-
tive branch .... ",272
In State v. A.L.I. V.E. Volunta y, 273 the Alaska Supreme Court dis-
approved as violative of the enactment provisions of the Alaska
Constitution 274 a provision that authorized the Legislature to annul an
agency or department regulation by concurrent resolution adopted by
vote of both houses. 25 In holding the enactment provisions manda-
tory, the court determined that the Legislature may only adopt resolu-
tions when acting in an advisory capacity; when it wishes to take
binding action, it must follow certain enactment procedures. 276
The court examined two specific legislative veto mechanisms in the
Alaska Constitution that established specific-and separate-time
frames for exercise of the legislative veto and specific-and separate-
votes to exercise the veto.2 77 The court found that, based on the Con-
stitution's specificity regarding these two provisions, no other legisla-
tive veto powers could be implied. 271 In addition, the court found that
the constitutionally expressed veto provisions did "not have the same
potential for the disruption of public expectations and ongoing execu-
tive programs that the blanket veto in question has," because they
only "annul proposed executive action, [and] do not change existing
law. '' 2 7 9
The Supreme Court of Alaska confronted arguments by amici curia
that, as the Legislature has the power to delegate a lawmaking func-
270. Id.
271. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). For an in-depth discussion of the Chadha deci-
sion, see supra notes 211-225 and accompanying text.
272. State ex rel. Stephan, 687 P. 2d at 638 (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)).
273. State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1980).
274. ALAsKA CONST. art. II, §§ 13-18. The enactment provisions require that bills be con-
fined to one subject and contain a descriptive title, that there be three readings of a bill each on a
separate day, that a recorded vote be taken on final passage of a bill, that the Governor be given
the opportunity to veto the bill, and that the bill become effective 90 days after enactment except
upon a two-thirds vote of each house's membership.
275. A.L.L V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d at 769.
276. Id. at 772-73.
277. ALAsKA CONST. art. III, § 23 (authorizing the Legislature to disapprove by concurrent
resolution changes proposed by the Governor in the structure of the executive branch of govern-
ment); Id. art. X, § 12 (authorizing the Legislature to veto by concurrent resolution municipal
boundary changes recommended by the state local boundary commission).
278. A.L.L V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d at 775.
279. Id.
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tion to an administrative agency, it may reserve unto itself part of the
delegable power, and may make a delegation conditional.280 The
Alaska court responded to this argument, stating that: "while the leg-
islature can delegate the power to make laws conditionally, the condi-
tion must be lawful and may not contain a grant of power to any
branch of government to function in a manner prohibited by the con-
stitution."' 1 Thus, the court found that the Legislature was bound by
the enactment provisions, even though the Legislature could delegate
certain legislative powers to others not so bound. As the court stated:
"The fact that [the Legislature] can delegate legislative power to oth-
ers . .. does not mean that it can delegate the same power to itself
and, in the process, escape from the constraints under which it must
operate." 2 2
Unlike the New Hampshire Supreme Court's more favorable view
of the legislative veto effort at issue in Opinion of the Justices,83 the
court in State v. A.L.L V.E. Voluntary brooked no sympathy for the
effort. The Alaska court cited a study of the legislative veto, which it
characterized as follows:214 "That study concludes, essentially, that
the legislative veto encourages secretive, poorly informed, and politi-
cally unaccountable legislative action. It is consequences such as these
that the enactment provisions of our constitution are designed to
guard against. 'I 2In
The concern expressed in the A.L.L V.E. case 286 regarding the dis-
ruptive effect of a broad legislative veto mechanism on the operations
of the executive branch became the linchpin of the New Jersey Su-
preme Court's opinion in General Assembly of State of New Jersey v.
Byrne281 and Enourato v. New Jersey Building Authority.288 In deci-
sions issued the same day, the court struck the veto provisions in
Byrne, and upheld them in Enourato.
280. Alaska Legislative Council and Administrative Regulation Review Committee.
281. A.L.L V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d at 777.
282. Id. (citation omitted). The court similarly answered the arguments that legislative over-
sight of administrative regulations cannot take place effectively if the Legislature must strictly
adhere to the enactment provisions, and that rulemaking is essentially a legislative function and
thus the Legislature must be afforded broad latitude to act in an area core to the legislative duty.
The court found these arguments to be irrelevant or contrary to the enactment provisions in the
state constitution, and thus dismissed them in fairly summary fashion. Id. at 778-79.
283. Opinion of the J.J., 431 A.2d 783 (N.H. 1981).
284. Harold H. Bruff & Ernest Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regula-
tion: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARv. L. Rav. 1369 (1977).
285. A.L.I V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d at 779 (citations omitted).
286. Id.
287. General Assembly of State v. Byrne, 448 A.2d 438 (N.J. 1982).
288. Enourato v. New Jersey Bldg. Auth., 448 A.2d 449 (N.J. 1982).
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In the Byrne case, the court considered a statute authorizing the
Legislature to veto by concurrent resolution of both houses "[elvery
rule hereafter proposed by a State agency."219 The Byrne court found
the statute violated the separation of powers doctrine specified in the
New Jersey Constitution
by excessively interfering with the functions of the executive branch.
The legislature's power to revoke at will portions of coherent
regulatory schemes violates the separation of powers by impeding the
Executive in its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the law.
The legislative veto further offends the separation of powers by
allowing the Legislature to effectively amend or repeal existing laws
without participation by the Governor .... 290
The Byrne court instructed that the separation of powers doctrine
did not require that the branches be completely insulated from each
other.291 The court stated that each of the branches represents a sepa-
rate source of power to "check the abuses of the other branches," 292
and relied on Marbury v. Madison293 to conclude that the constitu-
tional role of the court is to prevent the illegitimate exercise of power
by one of the branches over another.2 94
The Byrne court also held that the veto provisions violated the state
constitution's presentment clause2 95 which, like the separation of pow-
ers doctrine, prevents unwarranted legislative interference with the ex-
ecutive branch and checks excessive legislative lawmaking power. 29
The court characterized its charge as evaluating the legislative veto
provisions not in abstract constitutional analysis, but in examining the
veto's practical effects upon lawmaking by the Legislature and law
enforcement by the executive. 29 The court then struck the veto mecha-
nism, and summarized:
The chief function of executive agencies is to implement statutes
through the adoption of regulatory schemes. The legislative veto
undermines performance of that duty by allowing the legislature to
nullify virtually every existing and future scheme of regulation or any
289. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:14B-4.1, 4.4 (West 1986).
290. Byrne, 448 A.2d at 439 (citing N.J. CONST. art. III, § 1).
291. Id. at 441.
292. Id.
293. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
294. Byrne, 448 A.2d at 441.
295. N.J. Comsr. art. V, § !. para. 14.
296. Byrne, 448 A.2d at 443.
297. Id.
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portion of it. The veto of selected parts of a coherent regulatory
scheme not only negates what is overridden; it can also render the
remainder of the statute irrational or contrary to the goals it seeks to
accomplish .... 298
The court further complained that the Legislature was not required
to explain its reasons for its veto decision, which left the agency with
no guidance on methods for enforcing the law.299 The legislative veto
gives the Legislature an unlimited policy-making power apart from the
constraints imposed by the constitution, the court stated, including
the opportunity for gubernatorial approval or veto.3°° The court elab-
orated that the legislative veto provisions also gave the Legislature an
unlimited power to foreclose agency action, allowing the Legislature
to nullify enabling legislation or to redirect the application as though
the statute were repealed or amended, as the case may be. 10'
The Byrne court condemned more than the act of the legislative
veto, however; it criticized its very existence. The court found that the
potential to disrupt coherent regulatory schemes would force officials
to "retreat from the execution of their responsibilities" and resort to
compromises with legislative committees in drafting administrative
rules that it knows the Legislature will accept.3 0
The court found that agency regulations differ little from legisla-
tively-enacted laws in scope and effect.303 Administrative power de-
rives solely from the Legislature's grant of authority, the court
acknowledged, which the Legislature has the power to limit or abol-
ish.304 The court, however, was not persuaded that these arguments
favor the concept of the legislative veto of agency actions.
Instead, the court pointed to alternatives for controlling the execu-
tive, like the appointment of legislative oversight committees, which
can function without "presentment to the Governor and in many
cases by the vote of less than a majority of both houses." ' 301 In addi-
tion, the court stated:
Beyond oversight through legislative committees, there is some
additional room for legislative input into the execution of laws.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 444.
301. Id. at 445.
302. Id. at 444.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 447.
305. Id. (citing N.J. CoNST. art. IV, § 5).
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Certain types of legislative participation create only a minimal
danger of the aggregation of power in the legislative branch which
the separation of powers seek to prevent. This is particularly true
where the Executive has extensive control pursuant to a statutory
delegation of authority and the legislature has only limited power to
reject discrete projects rather than entire schemes of regulation. 306
A scheme meeting this test was upheld against challenge in Enour-
ato v. New Jersey Building Authority,30 7 handed down by the New
Jersey Supreme Court simultaneously with Byrne. In Enourato, the
constitutional challenge was to the New Jersey Building Authority
Act,3°s which authorized the Legislature to veto building projects and
lease agreements proposed by the New Jersey Building Authority.? 9
The authority issued bonds for construction projects for public facili-
ties.3 10 The creditors were repaid by building rentals assessed against
state agencies, which payments were subject to legislative appropria-
tion.3 1' All actions of the building authority were required to be ap-
proved by the Governor."' The Governor could veto any action of the
building authority within fifteen days -of the authority's meeting at
which the action was taken.313
Two provisions of the act were legislative veto mechanisms.3 14 The
building authority was required to submit to the Legislature any pro-
ject with an estimated cost exceeding $100,000, and if the Legislature
did not adopt a concurrent resolution of both houses approving the
project within forty-five days, it was deemed disapproved. 5 In addi-
tion, every lease agreement between the building authority and a state
agency required approval by the presiding officer of each legislative
house 1 16
The objecting plaintiff in Enourato alleged that the act violated the
constitutional separation of powers3 7 and the presentment clause"' re-
306. Id. at 448. The court, as an example, cited Brown v. Heymann, 297 A.2d 572 (N.J.
1972), upholding as constitutional the New Jersey statutory scheme for executive reorganization
wherein the Governor prepared reorganization plans for submission to the Legislature; the plan
would take effect unless disapproved by concurrent resolution of both houses within 60 days.
307. Enourato v. New Jersey Bldg. Auth., 448 A.2d 449 (N.J. 1982).
308. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:18A-78.1-.32 (West 1986).






315. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:18A-78.6 to 78.8(b) (West 1986)).
316. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:18A-78.9 (West 1986)).
317. N.J. CON T. art. III, § 1, para. 1.
318. N.J. CoNsT. art. V, § 1, para. 14.
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quirement that bills pass both houses and be presented to the Gover-
nor. The Enourato court upheld the legislative veto because it fell
"within the proper scope of the legislative oversight of executive ac-
tion." The court found it significant that "[tihe Act's veto power
[was] limited to approval or rejection of proposed building projects
and leases that require continuing budget appropriations by the legis-
lature." 3 19 The court reasoned that legislative oversight thus played a
necessary role in assuring continued support by the Legislature for the
subject projects2 20
The court determined that the veto provisions did not empower the
Legislature to revoke "at will portions of coherent regulatory
schemes. '3 21 Therefore, the Enourato court reasoned, the veto could
not cause substantial disruptions of functions exclusively vested in the
executive branch .322
The court focused particular attention on the feature of the New
Jersey Building Authority Act12 1 that required legislative appropria-
tion for the agency rental fees used to retire the issued building con-
struction bonds: "[1] f the legislature does not veto a particular project
and thereby approves it, this action will constitute a strong, if not
compelling, basis for the legislature to continue to appropriate suffi-
cient money to support the project." 3 A
The court found that the veto mechanism, through "[inducing] the
Authority to exercise care in selecting its projects," fostered coopera-
tion between the Legislature and the executive in an area "of mutual
concern. 3 2 The court noted that the Governor, as well as the Legisla-
ture, had veto power under the Building Authority Act.3 26
The Enourato court identified three features which distinguished
the veto mechanisms upheld in that case from the Legislative Over-
sight Act struck down in Byrne. First, in Enourato, the court found
that the Legislature could not usurp executive authority due to the
"Governor's full control over the selection of building authority pro-
jects .... "'327 The court noted that the Legislature had "absolutely
no control" over projects recommended by the building authority
319. Enourato, 448 A.2d at 451 (citation omitted).
320. Id.
321. Id. (citing General Assembly of State v. Byrne, 448 A.2d 438 (N.J. 1982)).
322. Id.
323. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:18A-78.1 to .32 (West 1986).
324. Enourato, 448 A.2d at 452.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 453.
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"unless the Governor first approves them."312 The court evaluated
this as giving the Governor "extensive authority in the policy-making
process." 3 29
Secondly, the court found limited potential for the Legislature to
interfere with executive action, given that the legislative veto "is lim-
ited to the rejection of discreet [sic] projects and leases ... "330 Ad-
ditionally, the Legislature was precluded from vetoing portions of
proposed projects and, thus, was required either to "veto the entire
project or let the project proceed. ' ' 3 '
Finally, the court in Enourato reasoned that even repeated exercise
of the veto would not alter legislative intent such that the Constitution
would require presentment to the Governor:
In enacting the Building Authority Act, the legislature clearly did not
want the Authority to undertake any project unless it met with both
legislative and gubernatorial approval. Exercise of the veto
provisions is not inconsistent with the regulatory framework the
legislature has erected to assume tight controls over the selection of
Authority building projects and leases. 32
The court found "more troubling" the concept that either house, in
effect, could veto a project by withholding its approval of the concur-
rent resolution sanctioning the proposed executive action.3 33 As well,
the court recognized that the provision in the law allowing the presid-
ing officer of one house to veto a proposed lease "exacerbates this
problem of concentrating legislative control." 34 The court worried
that concentration of authority in one house or in one legislative
member "threatens the separation of powers and the principle of bica-
meralism unless that power is narrowly circumscribed.' ' 335 The court
found that the provisions before it met the test specified in the excep-
tion:
328. Id. Of course, this argument cuts two ways. While arguably the Governor has a role in
the veto process in question in Enourato that is absent from the veto process at issue in Byrne, it
is difficult to view the legislative veto of a project receiving gubernatorial approval either as
especially cooperative or particularly indicative of executive authority.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 454.
331. Id.
332. Id. The court recognized "that future legislators may veto a particular project that the
legislators who passed the Act might have thought desirable. But this type of judgment is funda-
mentally different from a subsequent legislative nullification of a policy that a former Legisla-
ture enacted into law." Id.
333. Id. at 455.
334. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:18A-78.9 (West 1986)).
335. Id. (emphasis added).
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Here, the delegated authority is narrowly limited. No single house or
single legislator is empowered to approve new legislation. No danger
of precipitate legislative action is posed. To the contrary, the veto
provisions of the Act provide ADDITIONAL cHEcKs against Building
Authority projects which may in the future prove unwise or unduly
costly. The presiding officers have power to disapprove the lease
agreements only for building projects that the legislature has already
approved. These lease agreements involve no policy determinations
whatsoever; they merely establish rental rates sufficient to allow the
Building Authority to repay its bondholders. Thus, the Act's veto
provisions, despite their failure to conform with the principle of
bicameralism, do not offend the Constitution.33 6
Lastly, at least one state case has upheld the constitutionality of a
broad statutory scheme authorizing a legislative veto of executive re-
gulations by concurrent resolution. In Mead v. Arnell,337 the Idaho
Supreme Court considered a statute (similar to the statute struck
down in State ex rel. Stephan v. Kansas House of Representatives)38
authorizing legislative rejection, amendment, or modification of
agency rules deemed violative of the enabling statute's legislative in-
tent.
339
In its analysis, the Mead court focused on the nature of administra-
tive rules which "may be given the force and effect of law," but
found that they do not rise to the stature of statutory law.Y The court
reiterated that "[o]nly the legislature can make law." '341 In addition,
the Mead court handled the separation of powers question 3 2 substan-
tially differently than most of the other state courts discussed herein.
The Mead court did not find the legislative action to impinge on the
powers of the executive:
Here, the legislative action has not invalidated the executive
department's "execution of law." Such would be the case, for
instance, if the legislature had passed a concurrent resolution to
prevent the Attorney General from taking legal action for some
violation of a statute. Enforcing the law of this state is a
constitutionally mandated executive department function resting in
336. Id.
337. Mead v. Arnell, 791 P.2d 410 (Idaho 1990).
338. State ex rel. Stephan v. Kansas House of Representatives, 687 P.2d 622 (Kan. 1984).
339. IDAHO CODE § 67-5218 (1989).
340. Mead, 791 P.2d at 414 (citations omitted).
341. Id at 415 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
342. IDAHO CONST. art. II, § 1.
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the office of the Attorney General. In such a case no delegation
would be involved .... 345
The court distinguished the violative non-delegation hypothetical from
the issue before it, and stated:
Rule making that comes from a legislative delegation of power is
neither the legal nor functional equivalent of constitutional powers.
It is not constitutionally mandated; rather, it comes to the executive
department through delegation from the legislature. This court...
has consistently found the executive rule making authority to be
rooted in a legislative delegation, not a power constitutionally
granted to the executive. 3"
Thus, the Mead court dismissed the separation of powers argument,
finding that the greater mischief under the Idaho scheme is a scenario
wherein the Legislature would enact law without containing provisions
which, if included, might invite gubernatorial veto. The Legislature
might omit the "offensive" provisions to pass gubernatorial review,
but then later amend the implementing regulations to include the
omitted "offensive" provisions without presentment to the Governor.
As the court stated:
We deal here only with the rejection of an administrative
regulation. The perceived mischief is not present, or possible, in
rejection of a rule or regulation. This holding should not be deemed
to apply to any situations, set of facts or possible application other
than the rejection of an administrative rule or regulation that has
been promulgated pursuant to legislatively delegated authority.
345
343. Mead, 791 P.2d at 417.
344. Id. The court then engaged in an interesting twist of logic: it compared its action to the
U. S. Supreme Court, and by way of illustration, referred extensively to Justice White's dissent
in Chadha:
The action of this Court over the last fifty years so closely parallels that of the United
States Supreme Court in approving delegation of rule making authority to the execu-
tive that the arguments of Justice White dissenting in LN.S. v. Chadha are directly
applicable and state the case far more cogently than could this author ....
Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). The Mead court acknowledged, by way of footnote,
however, that the "legislative veto" in Chadha was held unconstitutional. Id. at 417 n.5. In part,
the quotations bemoan a legislative Hobson's choice-to refrain from delegations of authority
and thus write laws with an untoward level of specificity to cover endless policy circumstances-
or to abdicate lawmaking authority to the executive branch. Further, the Mead court notes
Justice White's difficulty in understanding why, if lawmaking power may be delegated to the
executive branch, the reservation of a check on legislative power through the legislative veto
violates constitutional precepts. Id. at 417.
345. Id. at 418.
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The court also disposed of the argument that contributed to the fall
of the statute in question in Legislative Research Commission v.
Brown:3 6 that the legislative veto violated separation of powers be-
tween the legislative and judicial branches. The argument was that the
Legislature was exercising a function that was exclusively judicial in
reviewing and interpreting rules and regulations to determine if they
complied with the legislative intent of the enabling statute.3 7
The court examined the constitutional role of the judiciary to deter-
mine whether an administrative rule conforms to the enabling statute,
and contrasted it with the Legislature's "statutory entitlement" to de-
termine whether an administrative rule reflects the legislative intent
embodied in the enabling law. The court held that the legislative veto
provision "makes clear that the legislature has reserved unto itself the
power to reflect an administrative rule or regulation as part of the
statutory process. This reservation is not an intrusion on the judici-
ary's constitutional powers. '3 48
Thus, the constitutionality and appropriateness of the legislative
veto remains an open question. The Florida courts have not been pre-
sented with the issue. Other jurisdictions, however, have grappled
with a number of concerns and issues that must be confronted in Flor-
ida if the state ultimately embraces the concept of the legislative veto
of administrative rules.
V. CONSIDERATIONS ON THE LEGISLATIVE VETO
This Article neither endorses nor condemns the idea of a legislative
veto. Scholars have reached differing conclusions as to its appropri-
ateness and legality. 49 Elected officials and courts likewise are divided
346. Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984).
347. Mead, 791 P.2d at 419.
348. Id. at 420. Although the court held the legislative veto provisions not violative of sepa-
ration of powers principles between the legislative and either of the other branches, the court
constrained itself thusly: "However, we do not suggest that all such legislative statutory reserva-
tions or rejections of rules or regulations pursuant thereto are necessarily consistent with the
separation of powers principles." Id.
349. For commentary that generally does not favor the legislative veto, see Harold H. Bruff
& Ernest Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative
Vetoes, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1369 (1977); Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The Congressional Veto and Sepa-
ration of Powers: The Executive on a Leash?, 56 N.C. L. REv. 423 (1978); John B. Henry 11,
The Legislative Veto: In Search of Constitutional Limits, 16 HAxv. J. oN LEOTS. 735 (1979). For
commentary that generally favors the legislative veto, see James Abourezk, The Congressional
Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52
fND. L.J. 323 (1977); Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Separation of Powers and Administrative Law:
Delegation, the Legislative Veto, and the "Independent" Agencies, 75 Nw. U. L. REv. 1064
(1981); James B. Pearson, Oversight: A Vital Yet Neglected Congressional Function, 23 KAN. L.
1993]
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as to the constitutionality and propriety of the concept. Ultimately,
elected officials and the courts will determine the wisdom and suitabil-
ity of the legislative veto as a tool for legislative oversight of executive
agencies.
The numerous attempts in Florida to increase legislative oversight
and control of administrative rulemaking generally, and to establish a
legislative veto, in particular, appear to evidence a continuing level of
dissatisfaction by the Legislature with extant methods of legislative
oversight of executive agencies.3 50 An examination of the legislative
history of these attempts indicates that the concept of the legislative
veto remains politically viable in this state. If, as it appears, there is a
continuing interest in the concept of the legislative veto, its propo-
nents might consider the numerous issues that have been raised in
Florida and in other jurisdictions before drafting a proposal. This Ar-
ticle seeks to identify those issues to facilitate their consideration. 51
Prior to discussing the legislative veto, an analysis of the interplay
between the legislative and executive branches is necessary. Article II,
section 3 of the Florida Constitution divides the powers of state gov-
ernment into three branches: the legislative, the executive, and the ju-
dicial. The provision prohibits any one branch from exercising any
power appertaining to either of the other two branches, except as oth-
erwise expressly provided in the Constitution. 52 Thus, unless other-
wise constitutionally provided, only the Legislature can exercise the
legislative power, only the Governor or executive agencies can exercise




For a comprehensive treatment of the legislative veto by individual states to that time, and
commentary, see L. Harold Levinson, Legislative and Executive Veto of Rules of Administrative
Agencies: Models and Alternatives, 24 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 79 (1982). For discussion and
commentary on the treatment of the legislative veto in the Model State Administrative Procedure
Act, see Arthur E. Bonfield, The Quest for an Ideal State Administrative Rulemaking Proce-
dure, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 617, 648-55 (1991).
350. See Appropriations Amendment No. 1 to Fla. SJR 766 (1992); Fla. SB 824 (1992); Fla.
HB 711 (1992); Fla. SB 319 (1985); Fla. HB 812 (1984); Fla. HB 252 (1983); Fla. HB 535 (1983);
Fla. HJR 3 (1982); Fla. SB 738 (1982); Fla. SB 921 (1982); Fla. HB 2, (1982); Fla. SJR 472
(1981); Fla. HJR 739 (1981); Fla. SB 457 (1981); Fla. CS for HBs 181 and 473 (1981); Fla. HB
181 (1981); Fla. HB 473 (1981); Fla. CS for SJRs 619 and 1398 (1976); Fla. CS for SB 1384
(1976).
351. [I]n discussing subjects, and arguing from evidence, conditioned in this way, we
must be satisfied with a broad outline of the truth; that is, in arguing about what is
for the most part so from premises which are for the most part true we must be con-
tent to draw conclusions that are similarly qualified.
THE Emlics oF ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEA Ermcs (J.A.K. Thomson, trans.).
352. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 2.
353. State v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 47 So. 969 (Fla. 1908); State ex rel. Young v. Duval
County, 79 So. 692 (Fla. 1918).
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While the Florida Constitution prohibits one branch of government
from exercising powers belonging to another, the lines delineating the
functions of each branch increasingly have become blurred with the
advent of legislative delegation. Some executive functions are derived
not only from the Florida Constitution, but from statutory delega-
tions of the Legislature. 54 Specifically, the Legislature may delegate
certain functions to executive agencies and require the promulgation
of rules to facilitate that delegation.355 Delegating legislative power to
the executive branch shifts the power to the executive, which in effect,
"lets the genie out of the bottle." In delegating its authority, how-
ever, the Legislature must limit or condition the exercise of the power
in order to maintain the constitutional balance of power between itself
and the executive branch. 56 If the Legislature is not satisfied with the
way the executive exercises its delegated power, it may attempt to re-
capture a measure of the power delegated. To some degree, however,
the executive has the power to resist the exertion of control by the
Legislature. The struggle becomes one of forcing a reluctant genie
back into the bottle.
Once the delegation is made, the Legislature oversees the executive
branch to evaluate its exercise of legislatively delegated power. This
Article has identified numerous mechanisms by which the Legislature
presently maintains oversight of legislative delegations to the executive
branch.35 The effective employment of oversight mechanisms by the
Legislature is the first step in checking the executive's exercise of a
legislatively delegated function. If the Legislature did not avail itself
of these oversight and control options, power over the delegation
would be shifted overwhelmingly in favor of the executive.
Through oversight, the Legislature may determine that the executive
is not exercising appropriately the delegated legislative power. Alter-
natively, the Legislature may decide that the scope of the original del-
egation is flawed. If the Legislature determines that the executive has
misapprehended its intent in delegating the powers exercised by the
executive, then it has not only a right, but a duty to modify the dele-
gation to clarify its intent. Similarly, it is appropriate for the Legisla-
354. Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1991); Askew v. Cross Key
Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978).
355. Chiles, 589 So.2d at 260; Askew, 372 So.2d at 913.
356. Chiles, 589 So.2d at 260; Askew, 372 So.2d at 913.
357. The Legislature maintains oversight and control by exercising plenary oversight by com-
mittees of jurisdiction; scheduling programs for review and repeal; auditing programs through
the Auditor General; requiring submission of executive branch rules to the JAPC; amending
enabling statutes; requiring legislative ratification of executive branch rules; and imposing lini-
tations through the appropriations process. Chiles, 589 So.2d at 260; Askew, 372 So.2d at 913.
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ture to modify its delegation if it finds that the power delegated is too
broad or is otherwise faulty. The traditional method by which the
Legislature checks the legislative delegation in these events is through
amending the enabling statute, either to rectify its deficiencies, or to
rein in the power validly delegated but invalidly exercised.
Once the Legislature has made its delegation of power, however,
the power has shifted to the executive, as the Governor can foreclose
amendments to the enabling statute by exercising the gubernatorial
veto. The Legislature, of course, may override the Governor's veto,
but only by a two-thirds vote.358 Thus, a legislative override of a gu-
bernatorial veto of an amended enabling statute may be only a theo-
retical possibility. The percentage of vetoed bills that are overridden
by the Legislature is statistically small.35 9 Thus, one might argue that,
as a practical matter, once the Legislature has delegated a function, it
has limited power to rein in that delegation through statutory amend-
ment.
It could therefore be argued that the legislative power to amend
statutory law is sufficient. Once the legislative delegation has been
made and implementation commenced, a compelling legislative inter-
est-or cooperation between the legislative and executive branches-
should be required to change the scope of the original delegation
through statutory amendment. On the other hand, at least one com-
mentator has argued that the difficulty in reining in the legislative
power once delegated imposes too great a burden on the Legislature:
When the delegator is the legislature, it has the power to specify
that some actions are within the scope of the delegate's power and
that others are not. If the delegate pursues an impermissible action,
the legislative power would be an empty one indeed if the legislature
lacked the simple power to constrain the delegate's actions within the
scope of the delegation. It has been argued that the legislature
should, at such a time, enact a new law to more specifically define
the scope of the delegation. Such a course, however, would subject
the legislative act to executive veto, requiring a two-thirds vote of the
legislature to override. This means that a two-thirds vote of the
legislature is needed to define more precisely the scope of a
delegation, when the original delegation required but a majority vote
to take effect. It defies logic to argue that the legislature, having by
358. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8.
359. For example, with respect to legislation passed in the 1993 regular session, the Legisla-
ture passed 413 bills. Of these, the Governor vetoed 16. The Legislature overrode none of the 16
vetoed bills. FLA. LEoIs., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BIL INIFORMATION, 1993 REGULAR SESSION, Statistics
Report at 6.
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majority vote directed an agency to take certain actions, should then
be required to muster a two-thirds vote in order to require the agency
to stay within the scope of that original delegation. 6°
Perhaps because of the difficulty of amending the enabling statute to
restrict the exercise of a legislative delegation, the Legislature exercises
a variety of mechanisms other than traditional statutory amendment
to shift power back to the Legislature.
First, the Legislature can restrict or limit an executive program
through proviso language attached to a legislative appropriation.3 6,
The Governor has significant constitutional power over legislative ap-
propriations through the line item veto; but the Governor may not
veto a proviso or restriction unless he also vetoes the appropriation to
which it relates.3 62 If the proviso or restriction is tied directly to an
important funding mechanism for the program, the Governor may be
forced to accept the proviso or restriction rather than jeopardize the
program by vetoing the proviso or restriction and thus the funding
mechanism for the program.
Second, the Legislature may assure that a delegation of power to
the executive branch will not be perpetual by scheduling the enabling
statute for future repeal and prior legislative review. The Legislature
generally provides for this mechanism in the enabling law itself. Thus,
initially, the Governor must either accept the condition- future repeal
with prior legislative review-or veto the enabling legislation and
forego the delegation. If a delegation is enacted with a mandated re-
peal and review, the mechanism facilitates legislative oversight by re-
quiring a legislative staff review. Further, it may serve as a mechanism
for enacting amendments to the enabling statute.3 63 Since the future
repeal date has been set in the enabling law, a law so structured will be
repealed unless reenacted by the Legislature and approved by the Gov-
ernor (or allowed tu become law without his signature). To save a del-
egation from automatic repeal, the Legislature may amend the
delegation in the legislative reenactment. The Governor either must
accept the amendments in the reenacted legislation, or allow the dele-
gation to expire automatically by operation of the future repeal mech-
anism.
Third, the Legislature may retain the power to ratify executive
agency rules in the initial legislative delegation to the executive
360. Abourezk, supra note 349, at 332 (footnotes omitted). See also INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 986-87 (White, J., dissenting); Opinion of the J.J., 431 A.2d 783 (N.H. 1981).
361. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 8(a).
362. Id.
363. See Alterman Transp. Lines v. State, 405 So. 2d 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
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branch, which subjects the exercise of the delegation to approval by
the Legislature.3" In these circumstances, if the Legislature does not
ratify the proposed executive agency rules, they do not become effec-
tive. Once again, the Governor is confronted with a choice: accept the
delegation with the condition that executive rules be legislatively rati-
fied or decline the delegation by gubernatorial veto. As in the case of
reenacted legislation, the Governor either, must accept legislatively
amended rules that are conditioned upon legislative ratification, or
lose the delegation that the rule implements.
Although the gubernatorial veto power may be strong enough to
overcome the legislative will, the Legislature also wields important
powers in conditioning, limiting, or withdrawing the legislative delega-
tion to the executive. Viewed in this context, a properly circumscribed
legislative veto perhaps may not be as dramatic an intrusion upon the
status quo as it otherwise may first appear. Like proviso limitations in
appropriations bills, mandated future repeal dates in enabling legisla-
tion, and required legislative ratification of administrative rules, the
legislative veto may be seen as conditioning a legislative delegation.
One of the more practical arguments against imposing a legislative
veto, however, is that it is unnecessary. Under current law, the JAPC
has the authority to object to agency rules which it finds are an invalid
exercise of delegated legislative authority.3 65 In response, the promul-
gating executive agency may modify, amend, withdraw, or repeal the
rule, but it is not required to do any of the foregoing.366 Instead, the
agency may adopt the rule, and it may become effective. The JAPC
objection in this case merely appears as a footnote to the rule in the
Florida Administrative Code. 67 In fact, an examination of agency and
legislative responses to the JAPC objections demonstrates that the
process works effectively either to conform the proposed rules to ena-
bling statutes or to motivate change in enabling statutes to embrace
the rule to which the JAPC has objected. 3"
According to the JAPC staff, while a few agencies initially refuse to
modify their rules following an objection, virtually all rules ultimately
are modified to meet objections. 69 Alternatively, in those cases in
which the rules are not modified to meet the objections, the enabling
364. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3177, 403.817, 403.8171 (1991).
365. Id. § 120.545 (1991).
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. See table supra note 54.
369. Document (n.d.) provided by Joint Admin. Procs. Comm. (on file with Fla. S. Comm.
on Govtl. Ops.).
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statute is amended by the Legislature to conform to the rule. 370 Based
on this experience, it can be argued that the imposition of the legisla-
tive veto is unwarranted by the circumstances. The rulemaking process
in Florida demonstrates that agencies, although not required to do so,
are willing to modify their proposed rules to capitulate to objections
by the JAPC. On the other hand, in cases in which executive agencies
resolve to adopt rules notwithstanding the JAPC's objections, the
Legislature has thus far been willing to amend enabling statutes to
reflect the position of the agencies.3 71
In analyzing the need for the legislative veto based upon these expe-
riences, however, one should recognize that the rules modified by an
agency are usually proposed rules. There is no systematic method by
which by the JAPC examines existing agency rules, and concerns
about a rule may not always be formulated at the hypothetical, pre-
implementation stage.172 In some instances, an effective comparison of
the rule to the scope of the delegated legislative authority may be pos-
sible only after the rule has been implemented. Thus, if the Legisla-
ture is dissatisfied primarily with existing rules, the fact that proposed
rules usually are modified to meet obligations by the JAPC may be of
somewhat less importance.
Even if circumstances heretofore have militated against the legisla-
tive veto, perhaps the demands of modern governance make a better
argument in its favor. Given the complexity of modern regulatory re-
sponsibilities and the level of expertise they require, the enabling au-
thority for a delegation may be inadequate to address the
circumstances within which the agency operates. As a result, there are
those who advocate broader enabling statutes that allow a greater
flexibility in the execution of the legislative delegation. A recent exam-
ple of legislation initiated at the behest of the executive branch is illus-
trative.
In 1993, the Governor proposed legislation to merge the Depart-
ment of Natural Resources with the Department of Environmental
Regulation. 73 The legislation that was filed, Senate Bill 1500 and
House Bill 1751,' 74 did not set out in full any of the amended acts,
sections, or subsections of the enabling statutes that it would have af-
370. Id.
371. Id.
372. Telephone interview with Staff of the Joint Admin. Procs. Comm. (June 29, 1993)
(notes on file with Fla. S. Comm. on Govtl. Ops.).
373. OFcFE OF TaE GOVERNOR, PRESS RELEASE (January 28, 1993) (on file with the author).
374. Fla. SB 1500 (1993); Fla. HB 1751 (1993).
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fected and purported to amend.37 5 The bills were written in broad
terms at the request of the executive branch in order to give the execu-
tive the flexibility to determine appropriate environmental and organi-
zational policies in the reorganization of two environmental
departments into a single department.3 76 The broadness of the lan-
guage granting reorganization authority to the new department was
discussed in at least one committee of reference.3 77 Some members ex-
375. See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 6. The Florida Constitution requires laws that revise or
amend to set out in full the revised or amended act, section, subsection, or paragraph of a
subsection.
376. Fla. S. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., tape recording of proceedings (Mar. 10, 1993) (on file
with comm.) (testimony of Virginia Wetherell, Secretary, Dep't of Envtl. Reg.).
377. A portion of the relevant testimony and comments was as follows:
Secretary Wetherell stated:
What happens when you get into all of the detail of an environmental reorganization
is what happened years ago ... everyone got bogged down in all of the detail. When
one party or the other attempts to upset the delicate permitting balance that we have
in this State, it gets bogged down; it's just as simple as that. And they were not able to
make any progress years ago....
Sen. Buddy Dyer, Dem., Orlando, stated: "But you are asking us to trust you quite a bit and I
want your assurance to this committee that that's warranted .
Secretary Wetherell stated:
Let me see if I can address that trust question. I think that as a previous member (of
the Legislature] I found that in every bill that I had to look at, there was some level of
trust that had to be there. You had to trust the committee staff who helped you pre-
pare it or who gave you their benefit of experience on it and gave you advice. You had
to trust other members who had more expertise in an issue than you have on a particu-
lar issue. You had to trust yourself to take a vote. You have to trust the executive
branch to carry out that law that you passed. So there's a lot of trust on every bill that
you ever look at. I'm not asking you to trust me; I'm asking you to hold me accounta-
ble for what we're going to do. There have been a lot of people to [sic] look at this
form of the bill who believe that it will make a difference in environmental protection
for this State; who believe that it will make a difference to business from a streamlin-
ing of permitting and who believe that it will work. So I'm asking you to hold me
accountable through this report; in 9 months we'll come back with a report; we will
have involved all of the stakeholders and we will have a report to you on what we have
done. And I plan to be back a year from now, God willing, and I know you do too.
So you will hold me accountable, I'm sure ....
Sen. Curt Kiser, Repub., Palm Harbor, stated:
[11f you see the references made in [the staff report on the proposed merger] you'll see
that I don't think that the staff has taken this issue lightly. I think that they're con-
cerned about going forward with a bill that's-like she said-brief and says in concept
what they [the delegates] want to do ....
Sen. Robert Harden, Repub., Fort Walton, Chair, stated:
[T. .IThe reservation I have ... is [that] by granting a "broad brush" authority to
the department . . . to merge those two departments . * . there are going to be some
substantial policy decisions that may be made through the rulemaking process ....
Obviously incidental in the merging of those two departments ... you'll have a great
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pressed concern that the grant of power to the executive was broad,
and that the enabling bills may not have contained adequate controls
on the new executive department.318 Proponents of the legislation re-
sponded that legislative debate on the myriad policy issues that under-
score such a major proposed reorganization would jeopardize passage
of the legislation. 79 Further, proponents argued that the statute's flex-
ibility ultimately would be checked by legislative controls, such as re-
porting requirements, following implementation of the broad
reorganization delegation. 80 Some executive branch delegates and
proponents read the reporting requirement as a promise to submit leg-
islation following the reorganization to conform elements of statutory
law to the terms of the implemented reorganization."'
The executive branch may find it advantageous to have greater flex-
ibility in implementing complex programs delegated by the Legisla-
ture. As it did with the legislation merging the departments of Natural
Resources and Environmental Regulation, the Legislature may coop-
erate with the executive branch and forego highly restrictive delega-
tions. While the Legislature may cooperate with the executive branch
by enacting legislation which is less specific and which provides the
executive with greater flexibility, the Legislature is likely to seek addi-
tional or more effective methods of legislative oversight and control in
the bargain. 8 2 In its search, the Legislature may reconsider some form
of the legislative veto.
A primary point to consider in any discussion of the legislative veto
is the effect of such a proposal on the fundamental scheme of govern-
ment. As enacted in various other jurisdictions and as proposed in
deal of latitude in dealing with those issues....
Fla. S. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., tape recording of proceedings (Mar. 10, 1993) (on file with
comm.) [hereinafter March 10 Committee Debate] (discussion of CS for SB 1500 (1993)).
378. March 10 Committee Debate, supra note 376; Fla. S. Comm. on Govtl. Ops., tape
recordings of proceedings (Mar. 17, 1993) (Mar. 22, 1993) (on file with comm.) [hereinafter
March 17 and March 22 Committee Debates] (discussion of CS for SB 1.500 (1993)).
379. See March 10 Committee Debate, supra note 376 (testimony of Virginia Wetherell, Sec-
retary, Dep't of Envtl. Reg., and discussion of CS for SB 1500 (1993)); March 17 and March 22
Committee Debates, supra note 378 (testimony of Charles Lee, Florida Audobon Society and
discussion of CS for SB 1500 (1993)).
380. March 10 Committee Debate, supra note 376; March 17 and March 22 Committee De-
bate, supra note 378. The legislation which finally passed, Committee Substitute for Committee
Substitute for House Bill 1751, contained a number of traditional legislative controls, including
declarations of legislative intent, reporting requirements, mandated future repeals and prior re-
views, mandated legislative ratification of selected rules, and appropriations limitations. See Fla.
CS for HB 1751 (1993); ch. 93-213, 1993 Fla. Laws 2129.
381. March 10 Committee Debate, supra note 376; March 17 and March 22 Committee De-
bates, supra note 378 (discussion of CS for SB 1500 (1993)).
382. See also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 974 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); General As-
sembly of State v. Byrne, 448 A.2d 438, 447 (N.J. 1982).
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Florida, the legislative veto is intended to serve as an additional means
of legislative oversight and control. Unless properly circumscribed,
however, the legislative veto may affect negatively the delicate balance
of powers between the branches of government.
A legislative veto may be enacted either statutorily or constitution-
ally. With respect to the issue of separation of powers, statutory
schemes appear to present the greatest difficulty. 83 A statutorily es-
tablished legislative veto that empowers the Legislature to encroach
upon the executive or judiciary is invalid in Florida. 3" While few
courts have embraced the legislative veto, those that have done so
have recognized that it cannot curtail or change the exercise of a con-
stitutional executive power. In Mead v. Arnell,3a5 the Idaho Supreme
Court upheld a broad statutory legislative veto power to reject,
amend, or modify an executive rule, because it found that the legisla-
tive veto power did not check the executive's exercise of a constitu-
tionally derived power, as opposed to a delegated power. 8 6 Thus, to
evaluate whether a statutory legislative veto offends constitutional
precepts, the nature of the power must be determined.387 To avoid in-
fringing upon the executive's constitutional powers, a statutory legis-
lative veto power must be limited to executive functions delegated by
the Legislature. 38
Notwithstanding the broad statute upheld in Mead, a statute au-
thorizing a narrower exercise of the legislative veto more likely would
pass constitutional muster than would one giving the Legislature
broad power to amend proposed executive actions. In this vein, a stat-
utory legislative veto may intrude less on executive powers if it oper-
ates only to reject or repeal, and not to amend, executive agency rules.
A legislative veto mechanism that permits the Legislature to amend an
administrative rule, as opposed to simply vetoing it, comes perilously
close to supplanting the executive function of rulemaking which has
been delegated to the executive.8 9 Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, con-
383. See, e.g., Legislative Research Comm'n v Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984); State ex
rel. Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1981); State ex rel. Stephan v. Kansas House of
Representatives, 687 P.2d 622 (Kan. 1984); State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (Alaska
1980); Byrne, 448 A.2d at 438.
384. This is implicit in Article II of the Florida Constitution. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
385. Mead v. Arnell, 791 P.2d 410 (Idaho 1990).
386. Id. at 418.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. This is not to be confused with the legislative ratification required of rules promulgated
pursuant to section 403.8171, Florida Statutes (1984), the vegetative index; and section
163.3177(9), Florida Statutes (1985), requiring submission of certain rules specifying criteria for
comprehensive plan elements, discussed, supra note 58-85 and accompanying text. Both of these
statutory requirements contemplated alteration or rejection of submitted rules by statutory en-
actment with presentment to the Governor.
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tains a panoply of processes for effective, thoughtful, and public exer-
cises of agency rulemaking. 9° A legislative veto mechanism which
allows the Legislature to amend rules would shift the focus of these
established processes.
Furthermore, a veto that authorizes legislative amendment of
agency rules might circumvent the underlying statutory standard or
policy without amending the enabling statute itself. A legislative
amendment of the underlying statutory standard through legislative
amendment of agency rules could, in effect, constitute an exercise of
the Legislature's lawmaking function that would bypass the guberna-
torial presentment requirements of the Florida Constitution.3 9'
The opportunity for the Legislature to change the existing statutory
policy or standard through the guise of the legislative veto is dimin-
ished, however, when the Legislature is given only the option of veto-
ing a rule rather than amending it.39 In exercising this type of veto,
the inquiry is limited to whether the rule is within the scope of the
legislative delegation. This type of legislative veto may be viewed as
functioning less as a lawmaking power, which requires presentment to
the Governor, and more simply as legislative guidance to the executive
in assuring faithful adherence to the enabling statute. 393 This type of
legislative veto would require the Legislature to resort to established
lawmaking procedures, which include presentment to the Governor, in
order to change a statutory standard or policy.
The integrity of the relationship between the legislative and execu-
tive branches would more likely be maintained if the legislative veto
were restricted to determinations of compliance with the legislative
delegation. It is precisely this restriction, however, which makes a leg-
islative veto provision suspect when analyzed in terms of the separa-
tion of powers between the Legislature and the judiciary. The
legislative veto, by nature, involves interpretation. It is the function of
the judiciary to declare what the law is.93 It is not the function of the
judiciary to make law, but to interpret it. Administrative agencies are
390. See FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (1991).
391. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 8(a).
392. This point is similar to one of the points raised by the challengers to the legislative veto
in Mead v. Arnell, 791 P.2d 410, 418 (1990). The point raised was that the legislative veto
amendment could be used to change the legislative standard or policy, without gubernatorial
presentment, to include policies or standards that could not have survived gubernatorial veto in
the initial enactment. Id. The Mead court noted the issue, but found that only the veto, and not
the amendment, was presented by the factual situation before the court and thus it did not pass
upon it. Id.
393. See, e.g., Abourezk, supra note 349.
394. Jackson Lumber Co. v. Walton County, 116 So. 771 (Fla.), appeal dismissed, 296 U.S.
667 (1928).
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subject to judicial power.395 The judicial function includes determina-
tions as to whether administrative rules comport with the legislative
delegation.3 9 If the Legislature is to interpret the law in a circum-
scribed, non-policymaking fashion, the exercise will closely mirror the
function of the judiciary. Therefore, a statutorily created legislative
veto may unconstitutionally vest the Legislature with judicial power.
It may not be possible to resolve the problem of legislative intrusion
into the prerogatives of the judicial branch in a statutorily enacted
legislative veto. In Florida, however, the problem may be avoided by
amending the constitution to grant the Legislature veto authority over
rules. The Florida Constitution provides an express exception for con-
stitutionally established deviations from separation-of-powers con-
fines .397
While a constitutionally established veto mechanism would elimi-
nate constitutional questions in the separation of powers between the
legislative and judicial branches, there are, nonetheless, practical con-
siderations which should be recognized. The Legislature takes public
testimony and engages in open debate in making law, whereas the ju-
dicial branch functions in a comparatively cloistered environment that
is more conducive to strict legal analyses. Public debates infused with
the desires of constituents and public policy preferences tend not to be
of the same restrained analytical mode as are judicial determinations.
Therefore, the Legislature may not be designed to engage in the type
of legal analyses for which the courts are designed.9 On the other
hand, the Legislature, through reliance on its staff's analyses, often
makes legal determinations when it adopts policy. In addition, a sig-
nificant percentage of the membership of the Legislature historically
has been comprised of lawyers. Legal analysis is not, therefore, an
evaluation foreign to legislative processes.
It would not appear that authorizing judicial review of a legislative
determination to reject or repeal, as opposed to amend, a rule would
be advisable. Providing for judicial review of a legislatively vetoed
rule would give the judiciary a greater power than it presently has over
a gubernatorial veto. The Governor's decision to veto a bill is not re-
viewable by the judiciary. If the Legislature vetoes a proposed rule,
395. Florida Motor Lines, Inc. v. Railroad Comm'rs, 129 So. 876 (Fla. 1930); Canney v.
Board of Pub. Instruction, 222 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969).
396. Florida E. Coast Ry. v. State, 83 So. 708 (Fla. 1920).
397. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
398. On the other hand, simply because the judiciary's constitutional role is to interpret the
law does not necessarily insulate the judiciary from considering policy issues when adjudicating
cases.
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that determination may be seen as functionally equivalent to the nega-
tion of a bill by the Governor.
On the other hand, the Legislature may decide not to veto a rule
that is placed before it. Commentators have grappled with the judicial
weight that should be given to the Legislature's determination not to
veto a rule. 399 It is arguable that the Legislature's inaction should not
change the existing processes or considerations by the courts in deter-
mining the validity of a proposed or existing rule. Those who main-
tain that the courts would not fail to be swayed by the Legislature's
action (or inaction) should be mindful that the courts are not daunted
by popular political support for enactments they find unconstitu-
tional. It is difficult to see the dynamics as fundamentally different in
this scenario.
While a carefully crafted, statutorily established legislative veto may
satisfy constitutional requirements, a constitutional legislative veto
may avoid the potential pitfalls of the statutory method, particularly
regarding the separation of powers doctrine. As noted above, the
Florida Constitution expressly recognizes exceptions to the separation
of powers doctrine. 400 Thus, even a legislative veto that encroaches to
some degree upon the powers of either of the other two branches
could be lawful if properly drafted and adopted as a constitutional
amendment.
Constitutionally authorizing the legislative veto may have practical
benefits, as well. First, it may limit protracted litigation over the con-
stitutionality of the legislative veto. Second, putting the proposal be-
fore the electorate for a vote, rather than simply adopting it
legislatively, would provide a direct measurement of public sentiment
for the concept. 401
Irrespective of the means of establishing the legislative veto, there
are additional practical implications to be considered. These include
whether a legislative record of the exercise of the legislative veto
should be maintained; whether the veto should be exercised by a com-
ponent comprised of less than the membership of both houses; and
whether the legislative veto should be used to invalidate both pro-
posed and existing rules.
Commentators have cautioned that, if the legislative veto is not for-
mulated to guarantee openness, the determination to veto may be se-
cretive and based on inadequate information:
399. See, e.g., Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 349, at 1429.
400. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
401. In November 1976, the Florida electors defeated a constitutional amendment to estab-
lish a legislative veto. See discussion supra notes 175-97 and accompanying text.
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When a legislative veto system is implemented, informal contacts
between the agency and the committees, staff personnel, and
members of [the legislative body] may increase. By their very nature
these contacts are likely to be secret, or at least undisclosed by the
administrative record. If the result is to deny interested persons fair
treatment, to deflect an agency from its statutory grounds for
decision, or to impair the ability of the courts to review rules, a
violation of due process or the governing statute may result .... 40
To address this criticism, any legislative veto-whether statutorily
or constitutionally established-should ensure that a legislative record
is created. When the Legislature enacts enabling statutes, a legislative
record is developed through the committee process. The committee
process gives the public and the agency opportunities to testify, which
thereby assists the Legislature in developing its legislative standard or
policy, and also works to inform the agency of the broad outlines the
Legislature intends in its delegation. Incorporating this type of legisla-
tive record in the legislative veto process would assist an agency to
understand the Legislature's perception of where the agency's devia-
tion from the enabling statute occurred. 403
The JAPC process and the process of legislative consideration
through substantive committees are already well-equipped to formu-
late a legislative record. Currently, the agency is made aware of the
views of some members regarding proposed rules by the JAPC's for-
mal consideration of objections in the rulemaking endeavor. These
processes-if used in a legislative veto scheme-would inform the
agency as to the specific deviations from the intent of the enabling
statute. Additionally, the agency would be given an opportunity to
convince the Legislature that the proposed or existing rule is within
the scope of the legislative delegation.
Neither the JAPC nor a substantive legislative committee, however,
should be the final authority for determining whether a rule is to be
legislatively vetoed. The legislative veto should be exercised by noth-
ing less than both houses of the Legislature. Legislative veto provi-
sions that vest final authority in legislative leaders, c6mmittees, or a
single house violate the concept of bicameralism that forms the foun-
dation of the lawmaking process. Since the entire Legislature deter-
402. Bruff& Gellhorn, supra note 349, at 1377-78.
403. A legislative record will not disclose efforts by lobbyists to sway individual legislators in
the decision to exercise the legislative veto over an administrative rule. Regardless of the method
the Legislature chooses to check an agency's exercise of delegated legislative authority-whether
by statutory amendment, limitations on agency appropriations, or otherwise-the same criticism
regarding lack of disclosure may be leveled.
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mines whether to delegate its power, the entire Legislature should
decide whether an executive agency rule falls within the scope of the
delegation.
For this reason, a proposed agency rule should not be required to
be "validated" by the Legislature before it is effective. If a validation
by the Legislature were required, a single house could refuse to ap-
prove the validation and effectively veto the proposed rule.404 Further,
there is scant evidence that executive agencies are so flagrantly violat-
ing the scope of their delegated legislative authority in such a wide-
spread manner that the legislative imprimatur is necessary before any
agency rule may become effective.
In this regard, chapter 120, Florida Statutes, establishes a number
of procedures that must be complied with before a rule is effective.
These include review by the JAPC, requirements for public hearing if
requested, proceedings to challenge a proposed rule, and judicial re-
view. 401 It does not appear that these multifaceted provisions have
been ineffective in assisting agencies in properly formulating a rule.
Moreover, legislative validation of agency rules would be cumbersome
and duplicative of processes already employed and available in the ru-
lemaking process. Further, it would delay unnecessarily the implemen-
tation of statutorily mandated programs. Instead, any legislative veto
proposed would be better established if it were calculated to be used
sparingly and in the most unusual circumstances. Requiring the execu-
tive routinely to submit each rulemaking proposal to the Legislature
before implementation likely would require a full-time commitment of
members to legislative duties, and would prevent the executive branch
from responding to legislative directives in a timely manner.
A final practical consideration is whether the legislative veto should
be limited to veto of proposed rules, or whether it should authorize
the Legislature to repeal existing rules as well. Limiting the use of the
legislative veto to proposed rules would ensure that entire regulatory
schemes would not be debilitated by the legislative repeal of an exist-
ing rule. On the other hand, as previously noted, very often concerns
regarding a rule are not developed until after implementation be-
gins.A A legislative veto which is limited to proposed rules likely
would be used more extensively by the Legislature than one which
reaches existing rules. The Legislature perhaps would decide close
404. State ex reL Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1981).
405. See supra notes 41-54 and accompanying text.
406. Presumably, this is one of the reasons that section 120.56, Florida Statutes, which es-
tablishes a procedure to challenge existing rules, was adopted. Further, the JAPC is authorized
in section 11.60, Florida Statutes, to seek judicial declarations of the invalidity of existing rules,
likely for the same reason.
19931
480 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 21:415
cases by vetoing the proposed rule, rather than allowing the rule to go
into effect, and thereafter evaluating whether the agency's implemen-
tation exceeds the scope of the delegation. Thus, foreclosing the Leg-
islature from exercising a legislative veto over existing rules actually
may encourage the Legislature to veto the proposed rules, rather than
resort to current oversight methods while evaluating the rules as im-
plemented.
Although using the legislative veto to repeal existing rules, in some
cases, may disrupt a coherent regulatory scheme, the same result
could occur under the present system if an existing rule is challenged
successfully pursuant to section 120.56, Florida Statutes. 40 Despite
this potential, there has been no hue and cry for repeal of this section,
which has been in effect since 1974. The disruption of a coherent pro-
gram through piecemeal invalidation of existing rules is a valid con-
cern, however, and the Legislature would be wise to take steps to
ameliorate this negative consequence. One way in which the Legisla-
ture could minimize this occurrence would be by subjecting the entire
regulatory program to review by appropriate substantive legislative
committees when a concurrent resolution is introduced to repeal an
existing rule. In such instances, the executive agency whose rule is be-
ing reviewed should be given the opportunity to be heard. This proc-
ess would serve to inform the Legislature about the regulatory
program. In the regulatory program review process, a legislative rec-
ord likewise would be developed to the benefit of the agency and the
Legislature.
If the Legislature is given only the authority to veto proposed rules,
this may cause a delay in implementation of the rule because the Leg-
islature is a part-time body. In some instances, a proposed rule may
become effective before the Legislature convenes to consider a recom-
mendation on a legislative veto. This circumstance would tend to fa-
vor the authorization of the legislative veto for adopted rules. If the
legislative veto were limited to proposed rules, the alternative in this
circumstance would be to give the JAPC the power to suspend the
proposed rule until the Legislature convenes. The Florida courts may
find, however, as did the Kentucky Supreme Court in Legislative Re-
search Commission v. Brown ,4 8 that the power to suspend constitutes
a "legislative veto" in and of itself. This could be found to vest the
"veto" power in the JAPC which, as discussed above, should not be
407. FLA. STAT. § 120.56 (1991).
408. Legislative Research Comm'n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (Ky. 1984).
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vested with the whole of the legislative power. These factors should be
considered in determining whether a legislative veto power should be
extended both to proposed and existing rules.
As is evident from the foregoing discussion, there is ample histori-
cal evidence that the Legislature is not completely satisfied with extant
methods of legislative oversight and control. Nevertheless, the Legisla-
ture may be inclined to cooperate with the executive branch in crafting
enabling legislation that guarantees broad executive branch operating
flexibility. If more flexibility in enabling legislation is desired, but leg-
islators continue to remain somewhat dissatisfied with present over-
sight mechanisms, it is likely that additional means of legislative
oversight and control of delegations to the executive, including the
legislative veto, again will be considered by the Legislature.
Drafters of any legislative veto should be cautioned that such a pro-
cedure inherently threatens the balance of power between the branches
of government. It should be drafted carefully so as not to strengthen
unduly one branch at the expense of another. In order to preserve the
balance of power and avoid constitutional infirmities, a legislative
veto should require action by the full Legislature, include an open
process replete with the development of a legislative record, and be
limited to a pure legislative veto-not a legislative amendment-of an
executive agency rule.
19931

